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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The cellphone market is an exciting and fascinating avenue for research. In 
it, one finds high-speed technological innovation, changes in social norms 
regarding public versus private space and behavior, issues of competition policy 
in concentrated industries, public-health and environmental concerns, 
regulation of communication media, and consumer-protection law regarding 
commercial relations between cellphone providers and their customers. Add 
onto that the ever-increasing array of services provided via cellphones, and the 
possibilities for research seem boundless indeed. The market is obviously 
important in terms of its size and social prevalence, but it also allows a peek 
into issues arising in other industries and the manner in which regulators and 
legislators seek to effect social change. The issues to be analyzed here will thus 
affect not only legal and public policy in the cellphone industry, but will serve as 
a basis for discussion of social, economic, and legal issues arising in other 
industries as well. 
This article focuses on the relationship between provider and customer, 
specifically on the complexity of available contracts and the ways this 
complexity might be harmful to consumers. In a nutshell, the question is 
whether the expanded choice offered to consumers acts to their detriment, 
rather than benefiting them, and what special circumstances in the cellphone 
industry might exacerbate this problem. Complexity-in-choice problems can 
arise in a multitude of ways, increasing choice while making comparison 
between alternatives more difficult. The cellphone market is a prime example, 
as consumers choose along multiple dimensions, including type of handset, type 
of contract, type of coverage, and more. Even after initial choice, cellphone 
usage usually varies over time, raising issues with following up and checking 
monthly bills and the difficulties of understanding what seem to many to be 
exceedingly complicated pricing plans, as well as their presentation in 
(purposefully?) obfuscated monthly bills. 
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Since the cited literature draws heavily from psychology on one hand and 
economics on the other, central themes will be introduced via experimental and 
empirical data. The use of specific and numerous examples will hopefully clarify 
the issues, and allow for looking beyond the anecdotal evidence to discern 
recurring themes evolving from human reasoning and the limitations thereof. 
The basic mechanisms of choice-making are investigated thoroughly in order to 
clarify the types of problems expected in different circumstances and to stress 
the difficulty of trusting the market to provide meaningful consumer choice. 
Experimental data and psychological literature are used to examine the 
consumers’ side—wherein cognitive limitations and biases lead to choice-
seeking that worsens eventual outcomes. Empirical data and economic 
literature are used to examine provider and market effects—wherein market 
structure exacerbates the problem and leads to strategic obfuscation by 
providers. 
The cellphone market will serve both as a platform for implementation, 
important due to its size and centrality in current social life, and as a particular 
example of the wider debate—whether and how much government should 
intervene in the marketplace to protect consumers apparently unable to protect 
themselves. Beyond the general issues pertinent to other consumer markets, the 
cellphone market has distinct economic attributes exacerbating these issues. 
Specifically, the high level of concentration characteristic of 
telecommunications markets affects the competition between providers in a 
manner directly affecting the provision of choice to consumers (and the latter's 
ability to bargain for it). Comparisons among providers’ offerings, which 
facilitate consumer choice between providers, may be strategically constrained 
through obfuscation, further reducing competitive forces. Furthermore, 
contractual complexity may allow price discrimination between consumers in a 
manner more severe whenever long-term relations between provider and 
consumer are expected (due to high switching costs), and subscription pricing 
prevalent in the cellphone industry plays a role as well.1 
Consumers face a multitude of decisions when choosing a cellphone 
provider or calling plan. They face a large variety of handsets, technical 
capabilities, and contract terms, seemingly giving them freedom of choice on 
many levels. The question is to what extent this choice is fictitious, a façade of 
consumer autonomy covering a reality of confusion due to the difficulty of 
comparing the different providers’ offerings. From a legal perspective, it is 
important to determine to what extent the multiplicity of terms raises issues of 
consumer protection and subversion of the competitive process. Deciding 
whether regulatory intervention is needed requires not only assessing 
consumers’ ability to effectively choose among the many offers, but also 
 
1. The discrimination issue developed in this article draws on the distinction between naïve and 
sophisticated consumers, specifically whenever some of the product attributes are difficult to discern 
and consumers differ in their cognitive capacity or market experience. See infra text accompanying note 
59. 
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deciding how regulators view consumers and how much psychological realism 
we are willing to admit into the legislative and regulatory process. 
This article focuses on the consumers’ vantage point and the legal 
assumption of consumer capabilities as a necessary first step of regulation. 
Although the focus is individual in nature (assessing cognitive limitations and 
resulting market behavior), the broader characteristics—such as provider 
concentration—are vital to the analysis and strongly affect the type of contracts 
consumers are offered. In other words, competition in the market is formed by 
a combination of “standard” economic attributes and psychological effects 
consumers cannot escape. As a result, contractual complexity may corrupt the 
choice process, allowing both consumer exploitation and lessening of 
competition. 
This article aims to elucidate the issues, fleshing them out both as a general 
phenomenon and as a specific implementation in the cellphone context. The 
aim is not to provide ultimate solutions, but to show the directions these 
solutions might take and the difficulties involved. Essentially, this article delves 
into the question of what “choice” really means, and the problematic nature of 
either trusting the market to provide it, or relying on regulation to protect it. 
The issues are discussed within the behavioral-economics framework, 
enumerating cognitive biases and their effect on consumer decision-making. 
There is an abundance of legal and economic literature dealing with proposed 
regulatory solutions for better-known and widely discussed biases, and some 
will be discussed below (along with their critics). The problem of hyperchoice, 
though, has yet to receive the same attention. Such a bias not only exists, but 
warrants special attention, as autonomy is both enhanced and limited by what is 
initially seen as consumer choice. 
II 
CONTRACTUAL COMPLEXITY—WHEN IS THERE TOO MUCH CHOICE? 
Consumers’ freedom of choice is usually seen as a good to be maximized, 
since increasing variety allows the consumer to find an alternative closer to his 
most preferred choice, as well as facilitating the expression of personal 
autonomy.2 Despite this, it is possible to argue that increased variety need not 
benefit the consumer and might be used by the provider to confuse the 
 
2. See, e.g., E.L. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 5 (1981) (noting the 
capacity to choose as the basis of self-determination); Jane Beattie et al., Psychological Determinants of 
Decision Attitude, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 129, 129 (1994) (noting the desire for choice). See 
generally E.L. DECI & R.M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF DETERMINATION IN HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR (1985). 
While freedom of choice allows for self-determination and autonomy, here, there can be too much 
of a good thing. The consumer’s ability to choose may be impeded by having too many alternativesan 
argument that will be at the center of the discussion below. See, e.g., Barry Schwartz, Self-
Determination: The Tyranny of Freedom, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 79, 79–88 (2000); Barry Schwartz, 
Freedom and Tyranny: Descriptions and Prescriptions, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 80, 80–81 (2001). 
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consumer and point him towards the provider-profit-maximizing options, as 
well as creating an unrealistic sense of choice and competition. 
The basic idea of complexity as an anticonsumer tactic is simple: given 
consumers with limited cognitive capability, their ability to know and 
understand the variety of alternatives is constrained. Thus, past a certain stage, 
adding an option does not add to choice, and may even detract from the 
decision-making process due to the cognitive load placed on the consumer. Of 
course, the consumer is supposedly free to ignore extraneous options or 
examine only the first x alternatives he encounters (x being a factor of his 
personal attention-span). Still, in reality, the problem is more severe: the 
attempt to assess the multiple options hinders choice even among the smaller 
number of alternatives consumers are capable of remembering and comparing to 
each other. Cognitive overload leads to mistaken decisions, and these can be 
anticipated, indeed planned, in a manner allowing providers to plan the number 
and types of alternatives offered, as well as the optimal order in which they are 
presented to the consumer. Furthermore, choice is often valued as a good due 
to the decision-maker’s ability to express autonomy by exerting control over the 
process. In contrast to this intuitive view, excess alternatives detract from the 
ability to handle the choice situation, and thus consumer autonomy suffers. 
A. Cognitive Overload: The Difficulty of Choosing 
The cellphone market typically offers an extremely wide variety of handsets 
and calling plans from which the consumer may choose. Seemingly, variety 
means choice, and increasing consumers’ choice enhances their welfare. 
Nonetheless, the question remains how good consumers are at choosing 
optimally when variety is large and uncertainty as to future effects prevails. 
Especially interesting is whether the rational model’s prediction—that 
increasing the number of alternatives increases welfare (due to ability to find “a 
better fit”)—holds when cognitive overload is taken into account. 
Assuming the human mind fulfills many purposes simultaneously, cognitive 
overload may be characterized as “cost of thinking,” a situation where brain 
resources are utilized extensively to understand a complex situation at the 
expense of investing mental effort in other actions.3 In the context of consumer 
choice, the cost of thinking includes not only the difficulty of understanding a 
specific offer, but also the resources necessary to find and compare relevant 
alternatives and the need to classify offers as competing or belonging to 
different categories altogether. Cognitive overload may lead to mistakes in 
 
3. See, e.g., Steven M. Shugan, The Cost of Thinking, 7 J. CONSUMER RES. 100, 108–10 (1980). 
For an economic model wherein the limited resource is time for thought, as well as experimental 
validation of the model’s results, see generally Xavier Gabaix et al., The Allocation of Attention: Theory 
and Evidence (MIT Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 03-31, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=444840. Among other things, this study found an inverse relationship between the number of 
options examined and the tendency to stop the search and choose—even when the advantage gained by 
continuing the search remained the same. 
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judgment, and also to a “decision not to decide,” deferring the need to deal with 
the question due to the difficulty of formulating a clear answer.4 Avoiding a 
difficult decision can take the form of delaying a purchase, or making a quick 
decision while avoiding an in-depth comparison that is difficult to make. Such 
quick decisions typically rely on a preliminary and superficial assessment of 
affective (emotion-laden) characteristics, deferring consideration of those 
attributes requiring more cognitive effort.  5  
This cognitive-affective divide was cleverly highlighted by an experiment 
conducted to test the relationship between cognitive overload and self-control.  6  
A group of subjects was asked to remember a two-digit or seven-digit number, 
while deciding what type of food to choose: chocolate cake or fruit salad. 
Memorizing the numbers created a cognitive load, with the two-digit treatment 
signifying a relatively easy task compared to the seven-digit treatment. The 
choice between chocolate cake and fruit salad was an attempt at testing the 
subjects’ willpower, under the assumption that fruit salad is often chosen via a 
cognitive consideration of health and fitness, necessary to overcome the 
affective tendency towards chocolaty instantaneous gratification.7 The 
difference between the groups was significant and stark. Among those 
memorizing two-digit numbers, thirty-seven percent chose the chocolate cake, 
while their seven-digit counterparts chose cake fifty-nine percent of the time. 
This cute anecdote exemplifies a general tendency accepted in the 
psychological literature—that high cognitive load “steals away” mental 
resources from other issues simultaneously considered, and reduces the 
cognitive availability necessary for self-control. The practical conclusion may be 
that when one would like to steer consumers towards a more affective and less 
controlled decision, creating conditions of cognitive overload is a good start.8 
 
4. See generally Eric A. Greenleaf & Donald R. Lehmann, Reasons for Substantial Delay in 
Consumer Decision Making, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 186 (1995) (discussing how consumers delay 
decisions). 
5. See Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics: How 
Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 9, 11 (2005) (discussing false 
interpretations of emotion-laden behavior). 
6. See Baba Shiv & Alexander Fedorikhin, Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect 
and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 282–86 (1999). 
7. Beyond the basic heterogeneity of preferences regarding these alternatives, supposedly 
distributed randomly and identically in both groups. 
8. See, e.g., John M. Hinson, Tina L. Jameson & Paul Whitney, Impulsive Decision Making and 
Working Memory, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 298, 304–05 (2003). The level of cognitive load does 
not have to be a direct result of the number of options. It also varies according to the structure of the 
question, the consolidation of information into categories, and the distribution of possibilities. Thus, the 
same number of alternatives can lead to different levels of cognitive load. See Nicholas H. Lurie, 
Decision Making in Information-Rich Environments: The Role of Information Structure, 30 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 473, 484–85 (2004). 
Another way of focusing information for consumers is to encourage them to create an “ideal 
picture” of the product they seek. Consumers holding such a mental picture use it as a fulcrum upon 
which to compare the alternatives they face. They essentially compare categories rather than lists of 
attributes, allowing for consideration of a larger number of alternatives. See Alexander Chernev, 
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Going further, it is possible to devise a decision-making process requiring the 
consumer to go through multiple stages, leaving the choice requiring the most 
self-control last, after the cognitive component tires.9 Complexity yielding such 
decision-making processes is not necessarily a planned anticonsumer tactic 
devised by businesses seeking to exploit their customers. Often, the large 
number of options is considered attractive by consumers, and they actively seek 
the (seemingly) enhanced freedom of choice associated with them. There are 
even arguments that such choice proliferation is detrimental to the producers 
offering them, and profit-maximizing requires cutting down on options 
offered.10 
One of the interesting aspects of choice overload is that consumers are 
generally unaware that variety may work to their detriment, and may be 
unaware of the effects of cognitive overload—despite their actions. For 
example, consumers have a known tendency to make a decision based on 
partial consideration of the reasons therefore, or even considering just a partial 
list of product characteristics, and “tell themselves” a reasonable story that 
justifies the decision. It seems most consumers are interested in the feeling that 
they chose correctly, and they are quite good at finding ad hoc reasons to prove 
their own wisdom. Furthermore, this preference is so strong that systematic 
evidence is available to show that people are willing to distort existing 
information in order to better suit their preferences, despite the distortion 
fooling no one other than themselves.11 One interesting phenomenon is that 
decision-makers find a way to prefer options whose superiority is easier to 
explain, not based on product attributes, but on the ease of answering the 
question, “Why is this option preferred?”12 Beyond that, in order to ease 
decision-making, there is a tendency to focus on easily compared attributes and 
base decisions on them, while ignoring more important attributes that do not 
lend themselves so easily to creating a clear hierarchy among alternatives.13 All 
in all, this first glimpse paints a rather bleak picture of consumers’ aptitude for 
utility maximization through product choice. 
Beyond questioning utility maximization, the argument for consumer 
autonomy suffers as well, insofar as legal policy should respect actual choices 
 
Product Assortment and Individual Decision Processes, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 159–
60 (2003). 
9. See K.D. Vohs et al., Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource 
Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 883, 895–97 (2008). 
 10. See, e.g., Cynthia Huffman & Barbara E. Kahn, Variety for Sale: Mass Customization or Mass 
Confusion?, 74 J. RETAILING 491, 506–07 (1998). 
 11. See J. Edward Russo, Margaret G. Meloy & Victoria H. Medvec, Predecisional Distortion of 
Product Information, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 438, 448–50 (1998). 
 12. See, e.g., Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 
COGNITION 11, 33 (1993). 
 13. See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals 
Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 247, 255–56 (1996). 
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made and refrain from interfering therein. Consumer choice is undoubtedly 
important from both an autonomy-respecting perspective and a revealed-
preference individual-utility-maximization perspective. Still, the evidence shows 
that actual choices made by consumers are not necessarily true “choice,” but 
suboptimal (some would say knee-jerk) reactions to circumstances subverting 
the choice process. If this is the case, and even more so if this is the result of 
deliberate business strategy seeking to exploit these weaknesses in consumer 
decision-making capabilities, the argument that legal policy should simply 
accept what consumers choose is not so simple. 
Even when lacking time or mental resources to make a full comparison 
among competing offers, it would be reasonable to expect the consumer’s 
decision will be made based on those attributes considered the most important 
(despite their full effect being too difficult to assess). In other words, a rational 
consumer aware of his limited capacity of considering all relevant dimensions 
would rate attributes based on their (subjective) importance, and consider as 
many of them as possible, weighted by importance and (the inverse of) 
cognitive cost. In contrast to this admittedly optimistic expectation, reality 
shows that when complexity is high, consumers tend to seek decision tools (that 
is, the methodology used to make decisions in high-complexity environments) 
reducing the dimensionality of the problem, usually through heuristics limiting 
the number of attributes considered. The problem is that such heuristics 
typically rule out options strictly preferred (by the consumer himself) to those 
remaining in the active choice set.14 Thus, consumers act in a way that 
effectively reduces their ability to find the best option, even according to their 
own subjective assessment. 
An especially interesting example may be found in a study where consumers 
were given a list of products in response to their internet search.15 Some saw a 
list of fifteen products to choose from, while others saw fifty such items. While 
those receiving a longer list are supposedly better off, this group chose worse 
products on average, after spending a longer time searching for them. A large 
variety does harm to the quality of choice due to the difficulty of comparing the 
alternatives, thus making identification of the optimal choice harder. Beyond 
that, a well-documented tendency is to prefer the option framed as the default 
choice. “Status quo bias” is a well-known phenomenon that received much 
empirical and experimental corroboration, becoming a central part of 
behavioral economics and arguments in favor of “soft paternalism.”16 Empirical 
studies show that in a large variety of circumstances, individuals prefer to stick 
 
 14. John J. Payne, James R. Bettman & Eric J. Johnson, THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER xi 
(1993) (noting errors arising from selective heuristics). 
 15. See Kristin Diehl, When Two Rights Make a Wrong: Searching Too Much in Ordered 
Environments, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 313, 317–18 (2005). 
 16. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); Richard H. 
Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003). 
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to the default option they were offered, probably in order to avoid examination 
of the different options and the risk of future remorse.17 This is true not only in 
economic applications, but also in such different contexts as maintaining current 
political structure, and even increasing support (or reducing resistance) to 
practices of torture carried out by U.S. officials on suspects of terrorism, when 
these were described as part of an ongoing practice rather than a new 
development.18 
The stress an individual encounters when facing a complex choice may lead 
to a preference not to decide at all, even when each of the alternatives is better 
than not deciding. An especially significant example in terms of economic 
implications is found in workplace retirement funds. In the United States, this 
has turned into an especially fertile ground for research, as employees need to 
decide on an appropriate fund when they are hired (and sometimes periodically 
afterwards), and the implications of their choice will be felt only when they 
retire. Since the economic implications are large (retirement savings 
accumulated over a long period), this is an especially difficult choice to make. 
Often several competing funds are offered, differing in levels of risk and 
reward, and the difficulty of understanding them combines with an ability to 
defer the choice to an unknown future date. If the decision is difficult to make 
now, but there is ample time (theoretically) to return to it in the future, the 
temptation to defer deciding is large. Because no change is expected in the 
complexity of the decision later on, the result is a dynamic reminiscent of 
“tomorrow the diet starts,” with a similar level of success. 
A fascinating study examining the relationship between the number of funds 
from which employees could choose and their actual choice showed a clear 
tendency to avoid choosing altogether (and thus implicitly choose none) as the 
number of alternatives increased.19 Since a picture is worth more than a 
thousand words, the results are shown as they appear in the original.20 
 
 17. See, e.g., Ravi Dhar, Consumer Preference for a No-Choice Option, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 215, 
228–30 (1997). There exists a significant strand of behavioral-economics literature dealing with the 
status quo bias and its implications in economic decision-making, such as choice of insurance policies, 
investment portfolios, and more. See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo 
Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, 
The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 
(2001). A related issue is “omission bias,” whereby inaction is preferred to action when adverse results 
are expected. It seems most people prefer to have negative outcomes “forced upon them” rather than 
blaming themselves for causing them to occur. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and 
Omission Biases, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 60–61 (1992). 
 18. See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of 
Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 912 (2004); Christian 
S. Crandall et al., Status Quo Framing Increases Support for Torture, 4 SOC. INFLUENCE 1, 6 (2009). 
 19. See Sheena Sethi-Iyengar, Gur Huberman & Wei Jiang, How Much Choice Is Too Much?: 
Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 83, 87–97 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Steve Utkus eds., 2004). 
 20. Id. at 91. For a fascinating discussion attempting to elucidate this common expression, see Jill 
H. Larkin & Herbert A. Simon, Why a Diagram Is (Sometimes) Worth Ten Thousand Words, 11 
COGNITIVE SCI. 65 (1987). 
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Figure 1: The Relationship Between Participants in 401(k) and Number of 
Funds Offered 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The general direction of the graph, decreasing from left to right, shows the 
reduction of participation among employees in any fund as their choice 
increased. It should be stressed that all funds offer matching contribution, 
meaning that employee deposits are matched by equal deposits made by their 
employer. Therefore, nonparticipation entails foregoing employer investment—
leaving money on the table. Beyond the reduction of investment, there was also 
a reduction in the willingness to invest in equity funds, preferring less risky 
alternatives. Supposedly, there should be no relation between the number of 
funds offered and the employees’ risk aversion, but it seems that in the 
background operates a dynamic of remorse aversion. Employees confused by 
the array of choices were also afraid they would be unable to choose optimally 
among them, leading them to avoid decisions as well as risks (both creating 
potential for future remorse).21 Both tendencies led to direct monetary loss 
because the more rewarding options were chosen less often.  22 Put simply, 
complexity of choice harmed the quality of choices made as well as willingness 
to make a choice at all. 
 
 21. The effect of regret-avoidance on choice is large, and it underlies many cognitive biases. See 
generally Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When, and 
Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 379 (1995). 
 22. This is not merely the preference of security over profit, of the type explainable by standard 
risk aversion. Here, the risk premium is so large that additional explanations are necessary, usually 
drawn from the behavioral literature. See generally Jeremy J. Siegel & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: 
The Equity Premium Puzzle, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (1997). 
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B. The Preference for Choice and Its Harm for the Chooser 
The previous section examined contractual complexity in the sense of 
offering a too-large variety of options to consumers, harming their ability to 
optimally choose the best alternative (subjectively speaking). The emphasis was 
on the difficulty of comparing among alternatives differing in their structure, or 
cognitive overload shifting choice from being reason-based to emotion-laden. 
The common factor so far has been an instrumental objective—finding the most 
preferred alternative from the chooser’s point of view. This section shifts the 
focus towards choice as a formative process—the advantage gained by the act of 
choosing itself, above and beyond the advantages of a “correct” choice. 
Most people share an intuitive judgment that the ability to choose is a good 
thing, and limitations thereof detract from welfare. Even when the choice is 
between “insignificant” alternatives, meaning ones whose instrumental 
contribution is slight, it is often assumed that making the choice (rather than 
having the choice externally forced) is in an individual’s interest.23 A noted 
exception is when choice is between negative alternatives—that is, choosing 
between bad and worse. There, most people prefer having the choice made for 
them, perhaps because it is easier to accept bad news when it is forced than to 
accept it as something people brought on themselves.24 Although it is tempting 
to classify the status quo bias under a preference for nonchoice, it is important 
to distinguish between the cases; choosing the status quo is not the same as 
avoiding choice altogether. 
It may very well be that a person prefers both receiving a variety of 
alternatives and ending up with the status quo. Some would call this self 
delusion, since in actuality such a preference does not entail true judgment, but 
acceptance of the default option because it is framed as such through the choice 
of another agent who set up the options in this way. Even if the default option is 
preferred not due to its content but merely because of its framing, the 
individual’s preference for receiving an array of alternatives is not negated. The 
cited studies (and many more) show a common preference for both receiving a 
list of alternatives (preferably long) and choosing the one framed a priori as the 
primary one, usually as the default option. This might sound strange (especially 
to those trained to assume the rationality of the decision-making process), yet it 
is prevalent nonetheless. The phenomenon of wanting to examine a variety of 
alternatives (preference for choice) is a common one, and distinct from the 
 
 23. See Diana I. Cordova & Mark R. Lepper, Intrinsic Motivation and the Process of Learning: 
Beneficial Effects of Contextualization, Personalization, and Choice, 88 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 715, 726–28 
(1996). This preference turns out to be so strong that rearranging the alternatives in categories makes 
them more attractive. The multiplicity of categories creates an illusion of increasing choice, even 
though the alternatives themselves remain unchanged. See Cassie Mogilner, Tamar Rudnick & Sheena 
S. Iyengar, The Mere Categorization Effect: How the Presence of Categories Increases Choosers’ 
Perceptions of Assortment Variety and Outcome Satisfaction, 35 J. CONSUMER RES. 202, 207 (2008). 
 24. See, e.g., Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Psychological Pleasure and Pain of Choosing: 
When People Prefer Choosing at the Cost of Subsequent Satisfaction, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 312, 323–24 (2004). 
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manner in which this variety serves the individual’s final objective of choosing 
optimally among them (preference among choices). How much so, and when the 
preference for choice interferes with the preference among choices, are the 
questions this section aims at elucidating. 
As before, an experimental example might clarify matters. In order to 
examine the effect of variety on purchase decisions, a tasting booth was placed 
in an upscale supermarket. Several types of jams were placed in a manner 
inviting store patrons to pass by and taste to their hearts’ content, perhaps 
purchasing a jar of jam for home use (at a discount). The experiment was 
conducted in both large and small variety conditions. The large variety was 
created by placing twenty-four types of jams on the counter, while only six jams 
were made available in the small variety condition. The number of customers 
stopping to taste, as well as the number of those subsequently purchasing, were 
noted. The results are simple and significant: When the tasting booth offered 
twenty-four choices, the number of shoppers stopping to taste was fifty percent 
larger than when only six choices were available. Thus, a clear preference for 
choice was witnessed. On the other hand, the number of purchasers among 
those stopping to taste was significantly smaller in the large-variety condition; 
only three percent of tasters actually purchased one of the twenty-four jams, 
while thirty percent of those tasting six jams made a purchase. The difference is 
not only in the percentage of tasters purchasing, but in absolute numbers as 
well—sales dropped when variety increased despite drawing a larger crowd 
(more interested customers, but fewer purchasers).25 
What is the lesson of this experiment? Insofar as it exemplifies a general 
phenomenon, there are two effects. First, a large variety attracts a significantly 
larger number of shoppers to stop and taste. Second, the large variety prevents 
a purchasing decision, an action that is supposed to mirror the implementation 
of a preference formed through tasting (or prior to it). This is not a case of 
consumers attracted merely for the tasting without having a purchase objective, 
since in that case there would be an increase in the number of tasters without 
increasing the number of purchasers. That phenomenon may well exist, but is 
far from sufficient to explain the dramatic drop in the number of purchases 
made.26 In the previous section, there were other examples of a large variety 
being detrimental to choice-making, due to cognitive overload. The important 
 
 25. See Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too 
Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995, 995–1004 (2000). 
 26. If the results were not so stark, they might be explained away by a selection bias in the 
experiment’s design. Selection bias exists whenever the type of people approaching a large-variety 
tasting booth (twenty-four flavors) is different from the type of people approaching a small-variety 
booth (six flavors). Theoretically, the first might be acting out their preference for tasting in itself, not 
being interested in a subsequent purchase. It may also be that only people truly interested in home 
consumption approach a small-variety booth. In order to overcome any such effect, the experimenters 
varied the hours in which the booth operated in each version and studied the demographics of the 
people approaching the booth in the different treatments. These controls, together with the stark 
numerical difference observed, strengthen the conclusion that a general phenomenon was observed. 
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distinction here is that consumers were attracted to the same thing that 
eventually blocked their ability to form a preference and purchase a jam, 
slightly reminiscent of the moth being drawn to approach the lamp, only to be 
burned by its proximity. 
It is important not to overreach in interpreting this example. Just as 
increasing the options does not necessarily benefit the chooser, it is not always 
detrimental either. In this case, there was a negative correlation between the 
number of alternatives and the purchase decision, but it is important to note 
that only two conditions were compared. By examining a larger array of 
“menus,” differing in the number of alternatives offered in each, a more 
complex dynamic is apparent. In the beginning, increasing the options benefits 
choosers due to their ability to switch to a (subjectively) more-preferred 
alternative. As the size of the menu increases, cognitive overload rises, and the 
difficulty of making comparisons prevents purchasing decisions.27 It is especially 
interesting to see that consumers interested in choice may still perceive the 
provider’s offer of choice as unfair. One study reproduced the standard result of 
variety as impeding choice, but added the twist of inquiring about fairness. 
Large variety added to the perceived unfairness of high prices, while not 
changing reactions to low prices. It is interesting that the author made a 
recommendation to reduce the number of offers made to consumers though 
she, as others before her, neglected to factor in that confusion is sometimes a 
good thing, especially where non-purchase is not an attractive option to 
consumers.28 
Returning to the context of choice, the exceptionally large number of 
alternatives offered in the typical cellphone contract requires focusing on the 
difficulty of choice in large-variety contexts. Of course, it is possible that 
nonpurchasing is different from loss of utility, and there is no way of knowing 
for sure that shoppers avoiding purchase suffered a loss. Although there is no 
way to read minds, the purchase decision expresses an assessment that the 
product is worth more than its price. A shopper who tasted and bought a jam is 
seen as increasing his utility compared to his previous, prepurchase situation. 
This follows directly from seeing him as implementing a preference to shift from 
one situation to another, presumably more-preferred. A large number of 
shoppers approaching the tasting booth shows their interest in examining, 
tasting, and perhaps buying, the jams. The fact that they eventually did not buy, 
insofar as this was caused by the larger variety placed before them, shows that 
the number of options detracted from their ability to implement their 
 
 27. See Avni M. Shah & George Wolford, Buying Behavior as a Function of Parametric Variation 
of Number of Choices, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 369, 370 (2007). Some describe this as an advantage of 
increasing variety up to a satiation point, lack of advantage thereafter up to a regret point, and a 
disadvantage after that. See Rémi Desmeules, The Impact of Variety on Consumer Happiness: 
Marketing and the Tyranny of Freedom, 22 ACAD. MARKETING SCI. REV. 1, 1–2 (2002). 
 28. See Sarah Maxwell, Hyperchoice and High Prices: An Unfair Combination, 14 J. PRODUCT & 
BRAND MGMT. 448, 452–53 (2005). 
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preference between alternatives, making the default option of nonpurchase 
seem simpler than solving the complex optimization problem they faced 
(although most consumers probably did not describe their situation in these 
words). 
Whenever simple alternatives bypassing the difficulty of high-variety-choice 
are present, these could be easily superior to nonpurchase. Simple alternatives 
thus become more enticing when surrounded by an array of choices, with the 
status quo bias as one example of this dynamic.29 In the context of the market 
for cellphone communication, simplicity may be achieved through a choice of 
options recommended by the provider, recognizable due to advertising, or a 
preference for simple tariffs over complex ones. 
This phenomenon (a preference for choice that harms the chooser) is far 
from unique to consumer contexts, and affects choosers long after the choice-
making process itself.30 For example, job seekers usually examine and compare 
a large number of alternatives prior to choosing (or finding) a permanent 
workplace. Apparently, searching too much is problematic here as well—not 
just “wasting” search costs, but also harming the quality of choice eventually 
made, as assessed by choosers themselves.31 
In the job-search context, a difference was found between the objective 
assessment of choice focused on easily measured parameters (such as starting 
salary) and the subjective assessment made by the chooser reflecting on her 
choice and the process leading to it. While a search focusing on maximizing 
starting salary will achieve that purpose, and usually a larger menu of 
alternatives will be better, it turns out that those investing more time in the 
search tend to regret their choice more, and describe the search process more 
negatively than those limiting themselves to a smaller array of choices.32 
Put simply, the tendency to search long and hard reduces enjoyment from 
the end result—not exactly the utility maximization that economists hold dear.33 
It is interesting to remember that already in the 1950s, Herbert Simon suggested 
 
 29. See Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset 
Allocation, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 537–38 (2010); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the 
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 118 (1996) (explaining how a large variety leads to 
choice in simple alternatives). 
 30. A preference for choice even when it does not improve the chosen alternative is not just a 
human trait. For documentation of the same behavior in animals, see generally A. Charles Catania, 
Freedom of Choice: A Behavioral Analysis, 14 PSYCHOL. LEARNING & MOTIVATION 97 (1980). 
 31. See Sheena S. Iyengar, Rachel F. Elwork & Barry Schwartz, Doing Better but Feeling Worse: 
Looking for the “Best” Job Undermines Satisfaction, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 143, 143 (2006). 
 32. See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004). 
 33. See Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice, 83 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178, 1193–94 (2002) (noting that maximizers were less satisfied and 
more sensitive to regret than satisficers); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND 
RATIONAL 261 (1957) (noting that organisms do not adapt well enough to “optimize”). But see Dalia L. 
Diab, Michael A. Gillespie & Scott Highhouse, Are Maximizers Really Unhappy? The Measurement of 
Maximizing Tendency, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 364 (2008) (criticizing the shortcomings of 
Schwartz et al.’s study). 
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that psychological realism dictates that the economics profession should 
emphasize satisficer-oriented models rather than optimizer-oriented ones.34 
Implementing the findings showing that satisficers reach higher levels of utility, 
leads to a conclusion that optimizers, aiming at high utility levels, should adopt 
a strategy of satisficing as well, but one aimed at measurable attributes such as 
pay (in employment search), or price (in product search). Thus, true 
optimization is achieved by aiming for a known benchmark, and stopping the 
search once this is achieved. Optimizing and satisficing should thus be 
understood as complimentary (rather than contradictory) routes to maximizing 
welfare. 
These types of subjective assessments affect objective criteria as well—
including for employers. Job satisfaction and salary satisfaction during 
employment are closely related to employees’ subjective assessment of the 
negotiation process prior to employment and affect employee morale (which is 
related to their investment in quality of work), as well as their willingness to 
stay at the workplace rather than seek alternative employment (forcing the 
employer to find and train new employees).35 
The tendency to prefer a large variety despite its harming enjoyment of the 
chosen alternative may be explained as the result of a two-stage process: First, 
one chooses a menu of alternatives, thus employing the preference for choice. 
Subsequently, one chooses among the alternatives on the menu chosen in the 
first stage, thus employing the preference among choices. The second stage is 
subject to biases when the variety is too large, but this affects first-stage choice 
only insofar as these biases are salient while choosing among menus, and it 
seems humans are imperfect at such anticipation and find it difficult to bring 
themselves to employ protective measures.36 When the separation between 
stages is strong, meaning the consumer is focused on variety when choosing a 
menu (such as when choosing to approach the jam-tasting booth), her 
difficulties later on (in choosing among jams) are an insufficient incentive to 
plan ahead. This is especially true when the corrective response is limiting the 
supply of choices to which she exposes herself or choosing a smaller menu in 
order to facilitate easier choice later on.37 
 
 34. See SIMON, supra note 33, at 261. 
 35. See Jared R. Curhan, Hillary Anger Elfenbein & Gavin Kilduff, Getting Off on the Right Foot: 
Subjective Value Versus Economic Value in Predicting Longitudinal Job Outcomes from Job Offer 
Negotiations, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 524 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=973825. 
 36. See, e.g., Alexander Chernev, Decision Focus and Consumer Choice Among Assortments, 33 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 50, 57–58 (2006). 
 37. See Emir Kamenica, Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product 
Lines, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 2127, 2142 (2008) (noting the tendency of consumers to focus on the stage in 
which they currently operate, and ignore or severely discount the importance of future steps they will 
need to take). 
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III 
IMPLEMENTATION TO THE CELLPHONE MARKET 
In the cellphone context, what happens to the consumer once she 
approaches the point of sale (whether physically or via telephone or internet) 
and stares at the multitude of available handsets, and plethora of alternative 
calling plans? The first impression is of much choice, and confusion probably 
sets in immediately thereafter. The choice of handsets is guided by subjective 
preference and is emotion laden. (Which is better, large or small handset? 
Black or red? How important is a five-megapixel camera relative to a three-
megapixel one? Is it better to have a small and convenient handset or a good 
keyboard for e-mail?) Rather than assess the full array of dimensions along 
which consumers must classify their preferences and compare to market 
offerings, the focus here will be on the calling plans, independent of individual 
differences and tastes regarding handsets and their many attributes. Choice of 
calling plans is simpler to analyze, as consumers generally have a single (and 
common) optimization objective—minimizing expected payment to the 
cellphone provider. With regard to this common objective, it may be possible to 
directly assess “better” and “worse” choices, allowing assessment of the choice 
process and the incentives underlying it. 
In order to minimize costs, the consumer must anticipate future use of her 
phone, since most calling plans provide a menu combining fixed and marginal 
prices (monthly payments and per-minute or per-second price), or a mixed 
bundle of such menus accounting for multiple uses (text messages, internet use, 
and so on). But the consumer generally does not know in advance the total cost 
of the cellphone contract. If she knew how much she would use the phone in the 
future, and when, she might be able to compute the ultimate prices of the 
different alternatives in order to find her optimal contract, given personal 
usage. Even if a service representative were willing to compare plans for her, 
knowing future use is difficult. 
Even a customer with usage history from another cellphone provider, or one 
changing (or “upgrading”) plans, is hard pressed to predict whether future 
usage will be similar to past usage, and she must take into account the effect of 
the calling plan itself on usage incentives. For example, moving from a plan 
where price per minute is high to one where it is low is likely to increase phone 
usage. Buying a bundle of “free minutes” incentivizes the consumer to use 
them, or at least dissipates any monetary incentive to limit usage (until the 
upper bound is approached). Here, the length of contract is extremely 
important, and is usually quite long. This is true either due to explicit 
commitments consumers accept in their contracts (minimum terms), or due to 
consumers’ perception that switching providers is an expensive endeavor (time 
and effort-wise). The following graph shows five hypothetical calling plans, 
allowing visualization of the difficulties of optimization.  
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Figure 2: Illustration of Five Hypothetical Calling Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The horizontal axis shows the number of monthly minutes, while the vertical 
axis shows monthly price. The dotted lines show alternative calling plans, 
beginning with a fixed per-minute price (“A” the steepest line), through 
increasing fixed monthly payments reducing subsequent per-minute price (“B”, 
“D”, and “E”). Moderate angles show a lower marginal (per-minute) price, 
while the higher vertical-axis origin shows a higher fixed monthly payment. 
Additionally, one alternative shows a step-function (that is, a fixed monthly 
payment for a bundle of “free” minutes) and a steep (high) price per minute 
thereafter (“C”). Note that plan “E” combines elements of both 
kindsessentially a high fixed monthly payment in exchange for an unlimited 
amount of “free” minutes (shown by the horizontal line signifying a marginal 
price of zero). Simply put, the graph shows five calling plans the consumer 
might choose from. Presumably, the consumer will choose the cost-minimizing 
one, given her personal-usage profile. 
The assumption that the consumer chooses optimally means that she will 
always be on the inner envelope of available alternatives, shown here by the 
solid line. As can be seen, this line is an amalgam of the different plans, so that 
as usage increases, the plan employed changes to minimize cost. Thus, an 
optimizing consumer begins with plan “A” when usage is low, switching to plan 
“C”, “B”, “D”, and finally “E”, which is cheapest for the highest-volume 
consumers. In the diagram, squares signify optimal plan choices given 
consumption, while circles show where a consumer would be using the wrong 
plan, paying more than necessary to allow for their chosen usage level. 
Taken in context, optimization seems like a very strong assumption indeed, 
especially when noting that the number of plans offered can be large, future 
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consumption uncertain, and optimization difficult. Empirical studies often rely 
on this (implicit) assumption that consumers choose their plan optimally, with 
no discussion of its appropriateness as a description of reality or as a basis for 
policy recommendations.  38  
The squares indicate optimal plan choices given different levels of phone 
usage, while the circles indicate suboptimal choices the consumer should avoid.39 
Assuming consumers are able to understand the different plans and to choose 
optimally requires that they be able to draw such a graph based on the details 
garnered from provider presentations (or other source) and correctly predict 
future usage. It is far from obvious that the standard consumer is able to carry 
out such an optimization exercise, especially taking into account that in real-
world situations, the appropriate graph includes many more than five 
alternatives and usage is usually unstable over time (although commitment to a 
given plan is). Importantly, the graph presented here includes only the simplest 
types of calling plans (based on minutes used), and excludes reduced prices to 
select numbers (friends and family) or during select times (night and 
weekends). 
Beyond the difficulties comparing plans and predicting usage, the graph 
applies only to voice calls. To add prices for text messages, a three-dimensional 
graph would be necessary, including price per message as well as bundles of 
messages (similar to bundles of minutes here). Since real-world application 
includes internet usage, downloads, and more, the required graph is 
multidimensional. In the example above, the necessity of presenting a printable 
graph requires two-dimensionality, but including other cellphone attributes 
shows that the optimization problem for n attributes requires n + 1 dimensions. 
Therefore, an assumption that the consumer optimizes when choosing a multi-
dimensional calling plan is a strong assumption indeed, and making such an 
assumption the basis for real-world policy recommendations (as some scholars 
do) is problematic to say the least. 
Based on the psychological evidence above, it seems cellphone providers 
have a clear interest in keeping price complexity high. As consumers are less 
able to compare among providers, competitive pressures that providers face 
weaken, at least on the price-reduction dimension. Simply put, complexity acts 
as a mechanism to reduce price competition, leaving other competitive 
dimensions intact. These dimensions include number and type of handsets, 
branding and advertising (creating customer goodwill or “feeling good” when 
thinking of one provider compared to others), customer service, quality of 
 
 38. See, e.g., Meghan R. Busse, Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular 
Telephone Industry, 9 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 287, 297 (2000) (“Assuming that a customer 
chooses the plan that minimizes costs for his or her expected level of usage, the effective price schedule 
a customer faces is the lower envelope of a menu of two-part tariffs offered by the carrier.”). 
 39. If we count the available plans from the origin upwards, this means that as the consumer’s 
monthly phone usage increases, he should switch from the first plan to the third, then to the second, 
fourth, and fifth—switching each time his plan lies above another available alternative. 
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reception, and more. Of course, complexity may be present in nonprice 
dimensions as well.40 
Some of these attributes are at least as difficult to compare as final prices, 
since the consumer is hard pressed to assess quality of service prior to her need 
to find a service center and stand in line there, or prior to experiencing the 
waiting time until the automatic call center directs her call, or assessing how 
many representatives she must speak to before her problem is resolved. Still, 
price is a very salient feature, and is prominent in most consumers’ purchase 
decisions. Absent a clear parameter for cellphone provider comparison, every 
provider can advertise in order to create an impression of low prices (employing 
“sales” and “special offers”), as well as make nonprice dimensions more 
prominent, aiming at product differentiation in order to achieve a superior 
position in the branding game. Lack of price competition is not lack of 
competition. Still, price competition has a direct and stark effect on provider 
profitability, and weakening it is a primary strategic business interest. 
Some may argue that in a competitive market, businesses will find it in their 
interest to offer a simple price structure in order to signal to the consumer the 
advantages they offer.41 The basic argument is as follows: a provider seeking to 
differentiate itself and attract consumers might offer a simple price structure to 
signal that it offers value for money—that is, a good deal. If consumers 
understand the signal in this way, and if competition between providers evolves 
to push other providers to situate themselves similarly to the first provider, a 
competitive solution arises where the providers offer their products on an 
identical, easy-to-understand price structure; meanwhile, providers obfuscating 
their prices are shunned by consumers. In short, competition may lead to price 
simplicity as long as the driving force of the model is consumer preference for 
simple price structures. In other words, insofar as consumers prefer such 
contracts, providers have an incentive to offer them. Of course, in reality, 
consumers may not understand such signals in this way, as they may see 
complex structures as preferable to simple ones due to their (theoretical) ability 
to optimize, or see the multitude of offerings as welcome variety—the 
preference-for-choice dynamic discussed above. When consumers do not punish 
 
 40. See, e.g., Paul A. Herbig & Hugh Kramer, The Effect of Information Overload on the 
Innovation Choice Process: Innovation Overload, 11 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 45, 46–48 (1994) 
(arguing that fast-paced innovation creates effects similar to those of cognitive overload). Since the 
cellphone market is highly innovative, complexity appears in consumer decisions not only due to price 
obfuscation, but also through the frequent technological changes in what a cellphone actually is able to 
do, essentially changing the product in question. 
 41. See Alexia Gaudeul & Robert Sugden, Spurious Complexity and Common Standards in 
Markets for Consumer Goods 23–27 (Ctr. for Competition Policy, Working Paper No. 07-20, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1038461 (noting how simplified prices are well received by 
consumers). 
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providers for offering variety in calling plans, there is no reason to expect 
simplicity in pricing.42 
Most cellphone markets are highly concentrated, with usually as few as 
three or four providers serving nationwide customers.43 Such markets are 
characterized as “oligopolistic” (few sellers), and operate differently than 
markets where many providers exert competitive pressure on each other. The 
most striking difference is that in an oligopolistic market, one provider’s action 
is observed directly and quickly by other providers, and they may respond 
accordingly. Thus, a cellphone provider advertising a reduction in prices attracts 
consumers, but simultaneously creates a strong incentive for its competitors to 
respond in kind, to avoid seeming more expensive. Contractual complexity of 
the sort present in the cellphone market makes comparison between the 
providers’ prices difficult, since there are many options and prices to compare. 
Since most price schedules are nonidentical across providers, even knowing 
which provider is the cheapest is a nontrivial endeavor. Since most consumers 
are unable to precisely assess their future usage patterns, a simple comparison 
of current fees against alternative offers is impossible. 
To illustrate, assume one of the providers offers a simple price schedule, 
such as a given unit price (per minute or per second) that is unchanging over 
time and amount of use. The average consumer will not know if such an offer is 
better or worse for him than the complex bundle offered by a competing 
provider. If the consumer views simplicity as a signal of quality (not necessarily 
a realistic assumption), other providers may follow suit and offer similar simple 
prices. Having done so, the consumer may now choose on the basis of easily 
compared prices, leading the providers to compete by lowering the price to 
marginal cost. Even ignoring the high fixed costs associated with large-
infrastructure industries, cellphone providers in such a world would find 
themselves sharing the market at low prices. Assuming similarity in provider 
costs, this would simply create price competition with low profit margins, with 
little change in market shares. This may be excellent for consumers, but not as 
attractive a prospect for cellphone providers. 
Of course, there is nothing new here; this is what competition is all about. 
But in an oligopolistic cellphone market, the providers have a better alternative 
available. The first provider, knowing that moving towards price competition 
 
 42. See, e.g., Stephano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self-Control: 
Theory and Evidence, 119 Q.J. ECON. 353, 393–94 (2004) (generally examining how providers react to 
consumers’ cognitive biases). 
 43. The U.S. cellphone market is served by four national providers (in addition to other local and 
niche players). This is characteristic of cellphone markets worldwide due to exceptionally high fixed 
costs in the industry. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 25–30 (2009), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-54A1.pdf; Jeremy T. Fox, 
Consolidation in the Wireless Phone Industry 15–17 (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 015-13, 2005) 
(calculating the market concentration (HHI) in the U.S. cellphone market at over 6000, even before the 
Nextel–Sprint merger); see also Patrick Bajari, Jeremy T. Fox & Stephen Ryan, Evaluating Wireless 
Carrier Consolidation Using Semiparametric Demand Estimation 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12425, 2006). 
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will only cause others to do the same, will not count on such a strategy to create 
much of a profit. Any advantage it gains over its competitors will be short-lived, 
and will eventually lead to maintaining current market shares—but with lower 
profits. In competitive markets, the multitude of competing companies creates a 
prisoners’ dilemma among them. They are all better off maintaining high prices, 
but each on its own prefers to be the only one deviating by offering discounts 
and attracting customers. With many companies, each has a small effect on the 
market as a whole; thus their incentive is to act unilaterally. This incentive 
grows when realizing that if they do not act quickly, another company will do 
the same, but sooner. 
The small number of large competitors in most cellphone markets allows for 
“solving” the prisoners’ dilemma, as the effect each provider has on the market 
is large, and long-term interaction creates indefinite repetition of the game. The 
providers are familiar with each other, and understand that their common 
interest in maintaining high prices dominates any interim profits a first-mover 
might make.  44  In the economic (and antitrust) literature, this dynamic is known 
as “oligopolistic coordination” or “tacit collusion,” but in most jurisdictions, 
there is nothing illegal about it.45 
Oligopolistic coordination in cellphone markets may manifest itself in two 
(intertwined) ways: the structure (and variety) of contracts offered, and the 
price in easy-to-compare options. Complex contractual structure adds to the 
difficulty of comparisons among providers, leaving the consumer befuddled 
about which offer is best. Despite this, some of the prevalent offers are 
relatively simple, such as constant price per minute, or fixed price per bundle of 
minutes. Of course, given the variety of cellphone uses, prices per text message 
or internet usage complicate even the simplest calling plans. Still, some offers 
are comparable and, in these, simple price competition abounds. Oligopolistic 
coordination prevents prices on these options from dropping too much (from 
the providers’ point of view), as well as maintaining the multitude of more-
complex offers in the market.46 Had competitive pressures been higher, one of 
the providers might try to show its advantage over others by offering something 
along the lines of “any price schedule offered by my competitors will be 
 
 44. A similar dynamic exists between U.S. cellphone providers, in a slightly more-complex context. 
There, each geographically separated market allows competition between local providers; but since 
some local providers are branches of national providers, multimarket contact exists between some but 
not all providers. The national providers can use strategies unavailable to the local ones, namely, 
responding in one market to actions initiated in another. See generally Philip M. Parker & Lars-
Hendrick Röller, Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership in the 
Mobile Telephone Industry, 28 RAND J. ECON. 304 (1997); Busse, supra note 38.  
 45. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
212 (2005). 
 46. There are good reasons to think complexity would not be competed away, even if the cellphone 
market were perfectly competitive. If consumers value choice and take variety as a proxy for it, 
providers will compete to offer more calling plans—resulting in consumer confusion. If consumers are 
unaware of the resulting confusion, they have no reason to leave a provider offering them what they 
perceive to be a good—variety. This issue will be discussed in more detail below in Part IV.B. 
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matched at an x-percent discount.” Such an offer would create price dominance 
for the offering provider, branding it as the price leader. Obviously other, 
nonprice, dimensions would still be up for grabs.47 
Despite the apparent allure of such an offer, it would create a downward 
spiral in prices that would probably harm the offering provider along with its 
competitors. While provider A offers a discount relative to provider B, the 
latter would lower prices so that provider A would have difficulty meeting them 
and maintaining profitability. Price competition would increase, lowering 
provider profits across the board. Still, even when such dynamics are absent 
from the cellphone market, this need not suggest that the market is not 
competitive, as competition on nonprice dimensions (including handsets, 
service, branding, special offers and promotions, proprietary services, and so 
on) are important as well. 
The question whether a certain cellphone market is competitive does not 
lend itself to an easy answer. The different dimensions examined might lead to 
conflicting results, with nonprice dimensions showing much more activity and 
vigor (especially apparent in advertising) than direct price competition. The 
providers’ interest in maintaining current price ambiguity, raising switching 
costs, and reducing consumer churn, is an important factor, though not the only 
one.48 On the other hand, it is also important to consider the opposite effect, 
whereby easily compared prices facilitate tacit collusion as providers can more-
easily adapt to each other’s prices. Providers operate in a complex environment, 
balancing between their interest in simple pricing structures allowing them a 
simple strategy of matching prices offered by other providers (facilitating tacit 
collusion) and their interest in price obfuscation making consumer comparison-
shopping more difficult (reducing competitive pressure). In this context, price 
obfuscation also allows for creating hyperchoice scenarios in which consumers 
choose suboptimally, thereby increasing provider profits. Suboptimal choice of 
calling plans is a common interest among providers, thus even without explicit 
collusion, an equilibrium can emerge whereby consumers are offered a 
multitude of alternatives creating a façade of healthy competition while actually 
 
 47. Of course, this article focuses on price (for simplicity’s sake), but branding and quality 
differentiation are no less important. There is no need to assume consumers are drawn to the cheapest 
provider, although this is the starting point for many. 
 48. Other issues require discussion, such as the control cellphone providers (those selling 
transmission) might exert on other markets, such as sale of handsets, accessories, or the transmitted 
content. There are reasons to doubt the necessity of these markets being catered to by the same 
businesses. Some see this integration as harmful to potentially competitive markets, since high 
concentration in the transmission market allows providers to exert market power in the accessories 
market, the content market, and others. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 389, 
389–91 (2007). Compare Scott Wallsten, Wireless Net Neutrality? (Progress & Freedom Found., 
Progress Snapshot Paper No. 3.2, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976749 with Babette 
Boliek, Net Neutrality Regulation in the Mobile Telecommunications Market: A Cautionary Tale from 
the Era of Price Regulation (Third Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Working Paper, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129517 (arguing that regulation in the cellphone market is 
unnecessary due to competitive pressures). 
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benefitting providers. Tacit collusion is thus facilitated both by price-clarity 
(allowing ease of matching competitors’ plans) and by price-obfuscation 
(allowing for easier consumer exploitation). Specific circumstances and 
consumer attributes determine which of the confounding effects is stronger. 
To summarize the discussion so far, contractual complexity allows cellphone 
providers to maintain conditions where comparisons among them are difficult, 
thus reducing the competitive pressure to lower prices and sacrifice 
profitability. The main point so far is the recognition that the plethora of calling 
plans and methods of computing cellphone prices hinders one of the most basic 
driving forces of healthy competition—comparison of prices by consumers. This 
complexity remains intact due to an interaction between cognitive limitations of 
human beings facing the choice between cellphone providers and calling plans, 
and providers’ interest in lowering competitive pressure—balancing their 
unilateral interest in attracting customers with their common interest in 
reducing transparency in the market. The consumers, on the other hand, do not 
contribute to the abolishment of complexity mainly because its base, the 
availability of multiple options to choose from, is considered a good they value 
highly. The attractiveness of variety in the first stage dominates the difficulties 
stemming therefrom in the second stage of actual comparison. In other words, it 
seems consumers are interested in the complexity providers manufacture for 
them, even if they are eventually harmed by it, and often complain later on. 
IV 
CONTRACTUAL COMPLEXITY AS A VEHICLE FOR DISCRIMINATION AMONG 
CONSUMERS 
Contractual complexity does not affect all consumers in the same way. 
Offering a variety of cellphone contracts allows the provider to discriminate 
between classes of consumers according to their willingness to pay (WTP) and 
to maximize profits from each class of consumers. The advantage the provider 
gains from differentiating offerings is its ability to demand a price closer to the 
consumer’s subjective valuation without offering its other customers the same 
price. Up to now, this article has assumed the provider offers a constant price 
per minute. If it were able to personalize prices, a provider would gladly charge 
high-valuation consumers more than it charges low-valuation ones, with 
discounts going only to the latter (who need to be enticed into the market. Since 
directly knowing another person’s valuation is difficult (even our own is not 
always clear to us), a technique of allowing consumers to sort themselves is 
helpful here.  49  
 
 49. In economic parlance, this is referred to as “second-degree price-discrimination.” See, e.g., 
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 142–44 (MIT Press, 1988). The term 
“discrimination” should not be construed negatively, but as a descriptive term denoting consumers 
being charged according to their varying willingness to pay for the product, rather than a fixed, uniform 
price. One of the common methods is the practice of retailers selling some products in two distinct 
types of packagingsmall quantities and “family-size” larger packages. The first cost less, but the per-
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A simple example will illustrate: assume that a minimum of 100 minutes per 
month is necessary for the ownership and operation of a standard cellphone. 
Further assume that 100 consumers exist, differing in their WTP, such that 
consumers range from the least eager buyer willing to pay at most $1, to the 
most eager buyer willing to pay up to $100 for the same minimum bundle.50 
Denote the consumers number 1 to number 100 respectively. All consumers 
view the first cellphone minutes, those changing their status from nonusers to 
cellphone users, as the most important ones; and all would buy extra minutes 
only at a lower price. Thus these consumers exhibit “diminishing marginal 
utility,” a standard assumption in most applications. 
In order to keep the example simple, assume the next hundred-minute 
bundle (moving from 100 to 200 minutes) is worth exactly half of the first 
bundle (moving from nonownership to cellphone-user status). The next bundle 
(moving from 200 to 300 minutes) is worth half of the second, and so on. Thus, 
the model exhibits consumers identical in their diminishing marginal utility, but 
different in their underlying preferences for cellphone use. 
A profit-maximizing provider will choose a price balancing the income 
generated by high prices (from those willing to pay) with the deterrent effect on 
consumption (of those forgoing cellphone use, or reducing it, due to its cost). 
Assume for now that the marginal cost of providing an additional minute of 
calling time is relatively small, and does not constrain pricing at this point. If the 
provider charges $1 per minute, it will sell one 100-minute bundle to the 
highest-valuing consumer (number 100) and none to other consumers 
(assuming only bundles are sold). If the provider reduces the price to $0.80 per 
minute, it will sell 20 bundles, to consumers 81 through 100. Reducing price 
further, to $0.40, will allow the sale of 60 bundles to consumers 41 through 100, 
as well as 20 additional bundles sold to consumers 81 through 100 (who value 
the second bundle at half the first, here $0.405 to $0.50, respectively). A profit-
maximizing provider will take into account both influences of price reductions 
(as well as covering costs, which this example assumed were a nonbinding 
constraint). The final price will be chosen accordingly, as well as by competitive 
pressure that will be assessed shortly. Consumers with a high valuation (willing 
 
unit price is higher. There, the purpose is attracting consumers interested in large quantities, but 
requiring a discount to consummate the purchase. The basic idea is that of diminishing marginal utility. 
All would pay a high per-unit price for the first package, but only “families” would pay much at all for 
the second. The larger size is in essence a bundle of an expensive first package, together with a cheap 
second packageaveraging a lower per-unit price than the smaller (first only) package. 
Some argue that these pricing tactics can also be used to mask a deeper-rooted “standard” 
discrimination, on the basis of race, gender, and other “suspect categories.” Such results may occur 
even if the seller had no such intention, as when social groups have different characteristicsbuying 
patterns, preference for credit versus cash, access to financial instruments, etc. See generally Jonah 
Gelbach, Jonathan Klick & Lesley Wexler, Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense To Pay 
Too Little?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2009). 
 50. Willingness to pay is obviously not a perfect measure of the product’s importance, as ability to 
pay comes into play as well. Still, willingness to pay expresses the consumer’s readiness to divert money 
away from other products and devote his buying power to the cellphone contract. 
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to pay more for cellphone minutes) directly benefit from the existence of those 
with low valuation, since in order to attract the latter, the provider reduces 
prices to the former as well. 
In order to separate between types of consumers, the provider could offer 
two bundles of minutes: a basic package, those first 100 minutes, at $0.50 per 
minute, and a separate package of 200 minutes at $0.40 per minute. This will 
lead customers 61 through 100 to purchase the large package, while customers 
51 through 60 will purchase the smaller one.51 Compare this to the fixed price of 
$0.50, in which customers 51 through 100 purchase 100 minutes each, or 
compared with a fixed price of $0.40 per minute in which customers 41 through 
80 purchase 100 minutes each, and customers 81 through 100 purchase 200 
minutes each. It is easy to see that the provider profits more from offering 
contractual variety—that is, a different price per minute in each bundle—than 
any fixed price it might possibly choose.52 In this case, a fixed price of $0.50 per 
minute will generate revenue of $2500, a fixed price of $0.40 will bring in $3200, 
and combining both offers ($0.50 in the 100-minute bundle and $0.40 in the 200-
minute bundle) will raise revenue of $3700.53 
Although the numerical example is merely illustrative, it can be stated 
generally that whenever the provider increases contractual variety, it is able to 
attract additional consumers while limiting loss from those who would 
otherwise pay a higher price. It is not necessary for the purposes of this article 
to continue elaborating the different types of contracts and the choices a profit-
maximizing provider might make. It is important, on the other hand, that up to 
this point, consumers were differentiated only according to their willingness to 
pay for voice calls, and within a constrained framework at that. By considering 
the much-richer reality of consumers buying not only in hundred-minute 
 
 51. To see why, note that the consumer will purchase the utility-maximizing bundle, that is, the one 
creating the largest difference between his valuation and the price charged. The 100-minute package is 
better than none at all to all consumers valuing the average minute at higher than its $0.50 price, and 
those are consumers 51 through 100. The second package will be purchased only by consumers 
increasing their welfare even more. Buying the larger package reduces the price of the first 100 minutes 
as well (from $0.50 to $0.40 per minute). In order to calculate the threshold above which consumers will 
prefer the larger package, we compare consumer welfare (CS) obtained by the purchase of each 
package, with x denoting the consumer’s valuation per minute according to the following formula: 
        5010040210040100)(  xxxICSIICS . 
In the first package (on the right-hand side), the consumer obtains 100 minutes, valued at x and costing 
$0.50 each. In the second (left-hand side), 100 minutes valued at x, and 100 additional minutes, valued 
at x/2 (due to diminishing marginal utility)—all costing $0.40. Solving the inequality shows that the 
second package generates more consumer welfare only when x is above 60; in other words, consumer 
61 and above will purchase the larger bundle of minutes. 
 52. See generally Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2221 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007). 
 53. From the provider’s perspective, in the first case it sells 100 minutes each to 50 consumers at 
$0.50 per minute. In the second case, it sells 100 minutes to 60 consumers, with 20 of them purchasing 
100 extra minutes, all at $0.40 per minute. In the third case, 40 consumers purchase the 200 minute 
package at $0.40 per minute, while 10 consumers purchase 100 minutes at $0.50 per minute. 
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bundles, and characterized by a differently shaped marginal-utility function, it 
becomes apparent that there exists a fertile ground for additional contracts to 
differentiate consumers further. Additionally, cellphones provide access to text 
messages, video calls, media content, e-mail, and Internet access, allowing 
contracts to differ not only along the price dimension, but along many other 
dimensions as well. Each of these dimensions allows for further contractual 
variety. 
Offering contractual variety will bring each consumer to seek out her own 
optimal offer, and in her choice, she signals to the provider information about 
her subjective valuation, which was information the provider previously did not 
possess. The consumer’s choice, then, is the method by which the provider gains 
the information necessary to offer a “personalized price” that maximizes profit. 
The provider creates contractual variety knowing that consumers will 
differentiate themselves, thus allowing it to offer discounts to attract some 
consumers without lowering prices for others. 
If cognitive load did not limit consumers’ ability to actually choose their 
optimal contract, and no other cognitive biases existed, then adding additional 
contracts could only help consumers. A study examining the utility providers’ 
gain from enlarging contractual variety showed that a relatively small number 
of alternatives were sufficient to extract most of the potential profit from 
standard consumer sorting.54 Given the cost of servicing different contracts (in 
addition to advertising and customer service), the provider would prefer to limit 
variety in calling plans. Here, the ability to differentiate consumers is beneficial 
to the provider, but not due to the sorting and discrimination alone. The main 
effect is contractual variety making comparison among plans and providers 
more difficult, thus limiting optimal consumer choice-making and lessening 
competitive pressure. Beyond that, there are two additional forms of 
differentiation—according to customer seniority and according to customer 
sophistication. 
From the cellphone providers’ point of view, there are good reasons to offer 
new customers low prices, while they are comparing offers from competitors 
and considering which network to join. There are equally good reasons to hope 
(and even expect) that existing customers will stay “loyal” to the provider even 
at higher prices.55 Along the same lines, if there are customers who lose their 
bearings in the thicket of multiple offers, there is no reason to offer them the 
same price offered to those investing time and effort to optimize their choice of 
cellphone contract. Such price discrimination allows higher profitability to 
 
 54. See infra note 73. 
 55. “Customer loyalty” is a common expression and important commercial goal for sellers. Still, it 
is important to bear in mind that “loyalty” here is merely a factual description of customers continuing 
their commercial dealings with the provider even when short-term gains are to be had from switching 
suppliers. Such loyalty could stem from emotional aspects and identification with the provider as a 
communal entity, but also from high switching costs (pecuniary or psychological) that consumers avoid 
by remaining with one provider over time. 
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providers engaging in it, but in a competitive market, this kind of discrimination 
is commonly assumed to be too difficult to maintain. The characteristics of the 
cellphone market allow discrimination to persist, and contractual complexity is 
an especially effective vessel by which to maintain this condition. 
A. Discrimination Between New and Existing Customers 
The cellphone market is characterized by consumers staying with their 
chosen provider for a relatively long time. There are several reasonable, 
objective reasons for this phenomenon: switching costs are high; and, although 
lower wherever cellphone-number portability has kicked in, there are still 
information and administrative costs to comparing among providers and 
making a transition. The effort involved begins not with the transition itself, but 
at the stage where the consumer considers a transition, and includes finding 
information about competitors, comparing the various offers, and accounting 
for the inconvenience of dealing with the issue altogether. The issue of cognitive 
cost is relevant here as well.  56  
When a customer considers a transition among providers, he must invest 
cognitive effort in comparing alternatives, a cost spared only when choosing to 
“stay put” and avoid deliberation. In this respect, staying with his present 
provider is the default option, and the status quo bias is relevant here as well. 
All this comes before the transition itself, which requires effort of the type 
many abhor, beginning with waiting for service representatives on automated 
phone systems, continuing through the necessary paperwork, and eventually 
following up on bank statements to ensure the new payments include no more 
than what the service representative promised. The more complex the contract 
and the larger the number of alternatives compared, the harder the task of 
choosing optimally and the more difficult it is to ensure that oral promises at 
the point of sale are reflected in the bill arriving much later. When each 
provider offers a different contractual framework, how can the consumer know 
which offer is really the best for him? Contractual complexity can thus be 
viewed as a strategy to increase switching costs between providers, so that 
existing customers choose to stay put and settle for the offers made at their 
existing provider. 
Beyond that, the structure of most offers requires commitment to enjoy 
lower prices, either through minimum-term calling plans or through purchasing 
the handset itself in installments. Consumers in their “commitment period” are 
not free to move to a provider making them a better offer, so they will usually 
not search out information regarding alternatives. It is important to note that 
switching costs in the cellphone market are mostly contractual; they stem from 
the provider’s strategic choice to offer a long-term binding contract, and the 
customers’ acceptance of such offers. 
 
 56. See supra Part II. 
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Long-term commitment in itself does not necessarily harm consumers. A 
rational consumer, committing to remain with a provider for a specified time, 
will take into account the length of that period before signing the contract. 
Comparison among providers will be according to price as well as length of 
required commitment and the probability distribution of future changes in 
consumption. Such changes are important, and there are many good reasons to 
think consumers tend to underestimate them, believing that the future will be 
similar to the present.57 In a fully rational model, the consumer will take into 
account that once he signs up with a provider, it will exploit his inability to 
switch away; but this dynamic is anticipated and compared across providers.58 
Contractual complexity makes such comparisons difficult, which in turn 
increases the difficulty of balancing present and future prices and understanding 
the way different alternatives play out along this dimension. Yet its effect goes 
further still. 
Offering a large variety of calling plans allows providers to attract new 
customers without offering existing ones the same terms, and to do so in a way 
that makes the differences inconspicuous. Lacking the ability to easily compare 
offers, new customers may be enticed while minimizing outrage (or mere 
frustration) on the part of existing ones. Furthermore, when an existing 
customer becomes free of any obligation to stay on with the provider, and turns 
to compare offers, he may be offered a calling plan superior to his current one 
so that the effort and inconvenience of transitioning to another provider are 
spared. Cellphone providers could achieve the same result through a simple 
discount, but the context of contractual complexity allows for the possibility 
that here, too, the customer will choose suboptimally, leaving the provider with 
a higher profit than when prices are clear. Furthermore, using such calling plans 
allows for tailoring a solution optimal to the customer’s current consumption 
profile, but not necessarily to future changes in phone usage. In a highly 
dynamic environment such as the cellphone market, optimality today does not 
ensure minimal price later on. When the customer stays for long periods on the 
 
 57. This is a well-documented trait most people share and is relevant in a broad array of future-
effecting decisions. Simply put, when someone attempts to predict his future preferences and choices 
(or make a current choice relying on such prediction), he is overly influenced by his current state, and 
underestimates the change in his own preferences over time. See generally George Loewenstein & 
David Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85 (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999); George 
Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. 
ECON. 1209 (2003) (providing an economic model and an assessment of the problematic case of 
choosing today to maximize future utility). 
 58. When consumers are rational, perfectly considering future utility in current decisions, switching 
costs themselves will not lead to higher prices even when the provider can change prices later on. Initial 
price will be low (to attract consumers) and later prices high (when consumers are “locked-in”), but 
average prices over the whole term of the contract will not be different from those in a no-switching-
cost market. This is so due to the assumption of perfect rationality, wherein consumers correctly assess 
future monopolistic pricing and average it with current low prices. See Paul Klemperer, Competition 
When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, 
Macroeconomics, and International Trade, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 515, 536 (1995). 
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same calling plan (whether due to a contractual obligation or due to high 
switching costs later on), the cellphone provider can anticipate a rise in 
profitability with future changes in consumption. 
Contractual complexity thus acts to raise switching costs, which allows for 
raising prices to existing customers while hiding the existence of discrimination 
among customers paying different prices for similar consumption. 
B. Discrimination Between Naïve and Sophisticated Consumers 
Consumers differ in their ability to cope with contractual complexity. The 
standard view is that consumers examine several alternatives and choose among 
them while under the influence of cognitive biases. This is true of most 
consumers, though they differ along two dimensions: the extent to which their 
decision-making is subject to these biases, and their awareness of these effects 
and their own susceptibility. Some simplify the analysis by segmenting 
consumers into two groups: “naïfs” whose decisions are affected strongly by 
biases of which they are unaware, and “sophisticates” who are aware of their 
difficulties in choice-making and are able to take actions to minimize these 
effects or employ strategies to lessen their susceptibility.59 The sophisticates 
might be able to navigate through contractual complexity, find the optimal 
alternative offered (or at least be aware of the difficulties facing them), and 
prepare accordingly. For the sophisticated consumer, having many alternatives 
means enlarging their information and choice sets—which will eventually lead 
to choosing a better alternative. For example, a sophisticated consumer will 
know to ask about calling plans not suggested to her, arrange alternatives in a 
table or graph to facilitate comparison, or examine the different providers’ 
offers based on her own consumption profile. Ideally, she will even take into 
account anticipated changes in future consumption, including the incentive her 
chosen calling plan will create to alter phone usage—as marginal cost per 
minute of calling time varies considerably across plans, and initial choice will 
drive behavior later on.60 
Naïve consumers, on the other hand, see the variety of calling plans as an 
advantage, even when it actually harms their ability to choose. They are 
unaware of cognitive load and do not prepare themselves upfront to handle it. 
 
 59. See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and 
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 509 (2006). 
 60. The incentive effect of marginal price on future phone usage is an important factor, both for 
consumers basing current choice on expected future consumption, and for providers aiming at 
increasing phone usage and changing consumer habits. The objective measure of marginal price per 
extra minute used is highly relevant whenever “buckets of minutes” effectively create a zero marginal 
price (thus encouraging use), and may be further exacerbated if consumers exhibit a tendency to 
exploit opportunities to their fullest—a “sucker effect” in which nonuse of free, included minutes 
confers a psychic cost. See Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter & Vernon Smith, Radio Spectrum and the 
Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase 21 (George Mason Univ., Law and Economics Research Paper 
Series No. 10-18, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1583098 (noting that the “bucket of 
minutes” plans purportedly had a strong effect in increasing consumption in the United States). 
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For them, the opulence of alternatives complicates decision-making; and 
eventually they will find themselves choosing according to rules of thumb—
unanticipated heuristics that lead them to suboptimal decisions. Importantly, 
the cellphone provider can fully anticipate these heuristics; and they play a 
major role in devising the types of plans offered, as well as the method of 
presentation and order of presented alternatives. Simply put, the naïve 
consumers are the target audience for contractual complexity, and they will pay 
higher prices than their sophisticated counterparts for the same consumption 
profile. 
Between these two extremes lies a spectrum of differing levels of 
sophistication. Consumers vary in their awareness of cognitive biases generally 
and the specific effects of cognitive load, just as they vary in the amount of time 
and effort they are willing to invest in order to overcome their biases or 
improve their ultimate choice by accounting for them.61 Focusing here on the 
extreme cases provides expositional clarity, but the general arguments apply 
more widely. Sophistication may be a personal attribute, varying across 
consumers, as well as a structural issue whereby individuals differ from 
providers. Insofar as businesses purchase cellular plans in bulk (for employees’ 
work-related use), sophistication should increase with size of purchase, as well 
as with experience gained by professional purchasers making a business 
decision. Still, it would be going too far to state this is merely a business–
individual distinction, as not all businesses are alike, exactly as consumers vary. 
The distinction between sophisticates and naïfs demonstrates the effects of 
contractual complexity. At first glance, it seems clear that sophistication allows 
consumers to find optimal calling plans, and thus sophisticates will achieve 
lower final prices than naïfs. A deeper look will show another effect intertwined 
with this one. Since complexity will push naïve consumers toward suboptimal 
choices, the providers in the market will profit from creating complexity, and 
the sophisticated consumers will benefit because more alternatives allow them 
more room for optimization. A model developed for a similar context is that of 
add-on pricing, or the existence of shrouded attributes—those characteristics 
whose price is unanticipated by some of the consumers.62 When naïfs are 
 
 61. These effects can be modeled by allowing naïveté to be a continuous parameter, as well as 
allowing for differing costs of time and effort, whether due to objective measures or subjective 
preferences (as some abhor paperwork and negotiation with service representatives more than others). 
See Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 689, 
690–91 (2006). 
 62. See supra note 59. There, the emphasis was on attributes the buyer imperfectly observes (or 
foresees), such as the price of ink when purchasing a printer. This price is theoretically predictable, and 
a sophisticated consumer will take it into account as part of each printer’s price. The naïve consumer, 
though, will focus on the current expenditure of the printer’s price alone. The result is competition 
among businesses to offer cheap printers and profit from future sale of ink cartridges. Even 
unconstrained competition in the printer market will not prevent this dynamic, and profits will be 
supracompetitive. The market imperfectly constrains pricing due to (naïve) consumers ignoring future 
costs. A business attempting to sell more-expensive printers with cheaper ink will find itself considered 
less attractive. 
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expected to underanticipate certain costs, providers will use this to enhance 
profitability. The fact that sophisticates do anticipate these costs and find ways 
to circumnavigate them, causes providers to raise prices even more to the naïfs. 
Put simply, the sophisticates’ success creates an externality on the naïfs. In the 
cellphone context, this externality is apparent when the same opulence of 
alternatives confusing the naïfs helps the sophisticates find their optimal 
personalized contract. For the latter, variety creates a fertile ground for market 
research and comparison, for the former—a high monthly bill. 
Although this section has focused on complexity in choice in calling plans, it 
is important to note that the same effect is present in complex cellphone bills. 
Whenever consumers complain that they can’t understand their monthly 
statement, they often refer to the complexity of several different charges, some 
with discounts or “cash back” promises that confuse them. It takes a 
sophisticated consumer indeed to follow the varying amounts present in most 
cellphone bills, and to invest the time and energy in phoning their provider, 
waiting in queue, and getting charges dismissed. The more complex the 
contract, the more difficult it is to verify that prices charged are the same as 
those promised. The more the provider relies on specialized “discounts,” the 
more awareness necessary on the part of the consumer—both in the planning 
stage, and later on when the actual bill arrives. Obviously, the multifaceted 
nature of the cellphone contract, including many attributes besides voice, plays 
an increasingly large role here.63 
There is a related distinction between cellular contracts for personal use and 
those for business use. A common assumption in behavioral models is that 
businesses are better able to assess their situation and employ full rationality, 
while individuals are laden with biases that are difficult to overcome. Such a 
clear distinction may be helpful for expository purposes (as is the dichotomy 
between naïfs and sophisticates), though obviously more muddled in reality. 
Business customers are often offered different terms than individuals, stemming 
both from economies of scale (as businesses often purchase many units within 
the same deal) and from sophistication generated by professional buyers 
investing in market research. Sophistication is the key issue, relating directly to 
the biases and cognitive load assessed here. Thus, the business–individual 
distinction is one example of the more general sophistication–naïveté divide (or, 
rather, spectrum) that will be further explored below. 
 
 63. The issue of bill presentation and format is central to some of the policy suggestions made by 
scholars dealing with cognitive limitations of consumers and providers’ use of correct but misleading 
information. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, infra note 78. We shall not delve into the issue of bill presentation here, 
in order to maintain focus on the main contribution of this paperhyperchoice in contract terms (and 
types) offered ex ante rather than misleading bills presented to consumers ex post. 
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V 
EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION IN REAL MARKETS 
Up to this point, this article has focused on the theoretical basis, both 
psychological and economic, for the problematic effects of complexity in 
cellphone contracts. It is important to examine empirical work as well, both in 
the cellphone market and in similar contexts, in order to verify that the issues 
raised are problematic in practice as well as in theory. 
In Great Britain, a study was conducted examining consumer choice among 
electric companies and types of payment options.64 The result shows cognitive 
load harms decision quality, even when the load stems solely from additional 
options. Most consumers failed to minimize costs by staying with their previous 
provider or payment plan (ninety-nine percent of those staying with the default 
option would have benefited from a change), though it would be wrong to infer 
from this a “mistake” on their part. It may very well have been a choice to pay a 
material price to avoid the mental effort involved in a change. The fact that a 
third of those who did transfer to a different provider did so in a suboptimal 
way is more difficult to rationalize away. A cumulative analysis showed that 
only a quarter of the potential gains from the entrance of a new provider made 
it to consumers’ pockets; this is a difficult and disappointing result for believers 
in competition and the free market. Still, the most interesting result is that 
consumer mistakes rose with increasing competition; in other words, increasing 
alternatives harmed consumers. As anticipated by theory, complexity led to 
worse decisions. 
In the United States, the effect of increasing competition on the variety of 
cellphone calling plans was examined directly.65 The American cellphone 
market developed from licenses granted in small geographical markets to local 
monopolies or duopolies, through gradual licensing of additional competitors 
varying across markets. This allowed for a side-by-side comparison of the effect 
of competition on separated markets. The important result is that the number 
of offered calling plans increased significantly with increasing competitive 
pressure. As a new provider was licensed and entered the market, the 
incumbent provider responded not just by lowering prices, but by offering new 
types of previously unavailable calling plans. This phenomenon is open to 
competing interpretations. It may be seen as an increase in consumer welfare, as 
each consumer can better personalize her contract, if we assume choice is made 
optimally. It may alternately be seen as an attempt to create a façade of 
competition while softening the competitive pressure to directly reduce prices. 
 
 64. Chris M. Wilson & Catherine Waddams Price, Do Consumers Switch to the Best Supplier? 6–14 
(Ctr. for Competition Policy, Working Paper No. 07-6, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
982530. 
 65. See Katja Seim & V. Brian Viard, The Effect of Entry and Market Structure on Cellular Pricing 
Tactics 32 (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 03-13, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=618221. 
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Of course, there is no reason to think only one of these is correct. The factual 
finding is susceptible to many interpretations. 
Interestingly, the authors of the American study do not pause to consider 
whether choice was conducted optimally, but immediately jump to the 
conclusion that increasing variety increased consumer welfare. They rely on an 
unstated assumption that consumers cannot be harmed by additional choice, 
and always optimize among available alternatives. This assumption is common 
in other empirical examinations as well, almost always unstated and untested. 
In order to more deeply examine the effects of overabundant choice in the 
cellphone market, Eugenio Miravete conducted a series of studies attempting a 
“rationalization” of empirical findings; in other words, he tried to explain, using 
the rational-choice model, whether consumers are optimizing choice by 
minimizing payment for cellphone services. First, he examined consumer choice 
in fixed-line telephony, wherein a distinct change occurred in the types of plans 
offered. 
Miravete collected data from a price experiment conducted by South 
Central Bell (SCB), the local telephone company in Louisville, Kentucky in 
1986.66 Until that time, SCB sold phone access in one bundle, a monthly 
contract offering unlimited local calls. When the provider wanted to add other 
options, it was asked by the regulator to conduct a price experiment to test the 
effect on consumers. SCB added a pay-by-use option with a lower monthly fee, 
but requiring a positive price for calls made; this was an attractive offer to 
“light” users of the phone line. The question was whether consumers would 
choose their optimal contract, and (especially) whether they would correct 
initial mistakes over time.67 The same database led other researchers to 
conclude that consumers have a strong preference (some would say too strong) 
for fixed-price options, where price is perfectly anticipated and does not differ 
by use.68 Contrary to these previous claims,69 Miravete concluded that consumer 
mistakes in choosing calling plans are explained by a dynamic process of initial 
assessment, receiving data on actual use and payment, and correction of 
 
 66. See Eugene J. Miravete, Choosing the Wrong Calling Plan? Ignorance and Learning, 93 AM. 
ECON. REV. 297, 299–301 (2002); Eugene J. Miravete, Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service 
with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 943, 945–48 (2002). 
 67. Since phone use varies over time, consumers will not always know which option is cheapest for 
them. Thus, the question is not merely initial choice among calling plans, but attention to changes and 
re-optimization—an ex post learning process of adapting to slowly unveiling information about their 
own phone use. 
 68. See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Donna Lawson, Local Telephone Calling Demand When 
Customers Face Optimal and Nonlinear Price Schedules 27–28 (Univ. of Mich., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research & Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, Working Paper, 1993). 
 69. See generally Michael Hobson & Richard H. Spady, The Demand for Local Telephone Service 
Under Optional Local Measured Service (Bellcore, Economics Discussion Paper No. 50, 1988); Kenneth 
E. Train, Daniel L. McFadden & Moshe Ben-Akiva, The Demand for Local Telephone Service: A Fully 
Discrete Model of Residential Calling Patterns and Service Choices, 18 RAND J. ECON. 109 (1987); John 
P. Kling & Stephen S. van der Ploeg, Estimating Local Call Elasticities with a Model of Stochastic Class 
of Service and Usage Choice, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND MODELING: AN INTEGRATED 
VIEW 119 (Alain de Fontenay, Mary H. Shugard & David S. Sibley eds., 1990). 
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mistakes over time. This process fits with the assumption that consumers 
rationally minimize their phone bill. Their bias towards fixed-price options was 
explained by an overestimation of their future phone usage, one that was 
corrected over time if proven wrong. The findings that consumers were slow to 
correct such mistakes and showed a status quo bias were explained by their 
uncertainty regarding the future. 
While it is interesting to discuss consumer mistakes and possible later 
corrections, a study comparing two pricing options is far from sufficient to 
understand the current cellphone situation, in which a large number of calling 
plans with many differing attributes make direct comparison very difficult. It 
may very well be that consumers are able to optimize among two clearly distinct 
alternatives in which the salience of differences is high due to a single pre-
change price with no options suddenly being augmented by a relatively simple 
alternative. 
In order to check whether a rich menu of pricing options allows the 
cellphone provider to mislead consumers into choosing the wrong calling plan, 
Miravete chose to study what he called “foggy pricing.”70 The basic idea is 
simple: if calling plans exist in order to confuse consumers, the cellphone 
providers must be pointing them towards plans in which payment is higher. 
Consumers, obviously, are not interested in paying more than necessary for 
their cellphone service, thus their choice was seen as a mistake if they clearly 
are paying too much. Since the study was empirical and based on real-world 
data, a clearly defined mistake must be identified to differentiate choice (and 
heterogeneity of tastes) from confusion. A price was termed “foggy” if it was 
clearly dominated by others—that is, it could not be chosen but for a mistake in 
understanding the options. Dominated calling plans are those for which cheaper 
alternatives are available for any possible consumption profile during all (or at 
least most) hours of the day.71 
A foggy price is supposedly not in the provider’s interest because if 
consumers choose optimally, or at least correct initial mistakes relatively 
quickly, such plans should not survive in the marketplace. Nevertheless, such 
plans were offered and their number rose in direct proportion to the 
competitiveness in the relevant market. In other words, when a cellphone 
provider obtained a local monopoly (a common starting point for most U.S. 
cellphone markets), almost no foggy options were offered. As local competition 
increased, providers rushed to offer more and more calling plans, with some of 
 
 70. See Eugenio J. Miravete, The Doubtful Profitability of Foggy Pricing 2–3 (NET Inst., Working 
Paper No. 04-07, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=618465. 
 71. Due to different structures of calling plans, one may be cheaper during specific times, even 
though the consumer should still not choose it because it is dominated at other times. The first 
definition of “foggy prices,” a fully dominated tariff, is simple and binary—each calling plan is either 
foggy or it is not. The second definition allows more flexibility as well as a measurement of range—the 
fogginess is measured continuously according to the length of time in which it is dominated. This allows 
a full ranking of plans and measurement of the conditions leading to the amount of fogginess in the 
offered prices. 
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these being “foggy.”72 This can be explained as competition causing cellphone 
providers to focus on raising profitability through creating confusion and 
gaining from consumer mistakes, as the simple high-price strategy was no 
longer viable. 
It should be stressed that the definition used by Miravete for foggy pricing 
was especially strict and limiting. A dominated calling plan is one that can 
always be improved by switching, but if the aim was examining the consumer’s 
point of view, it is more important to see to what extent consumers chose the 
optimal plan—not just the extent to which they chose the worst one available. If 
creating complexity through an overly rich menu of alternatives reduces the 
consumer’s ability to choose correctly, that is enough to warrant critique even if 
they avoided a worse option. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that a 
rational profit-maximizing business would create such foggy options. It is easier 
to create a network of prices that all have attributes making them better for 
different times or consumption profiles, although none is “best.” If a large 
variety allows higher final prices, there is no need to create a “worst” option. 
Variety that makes optimal choice by consumers difficult, allows the provider to 
profit from mistakes. If complexity makes comparison difficult, this is sufficient 
to raise profits and there is no reason for the provider to seek out dominated, or 
foggy, prices. 
Finally, it is especially interesting to note that Miravete could not find a 
rational explanation for the variety of calling plans, one which does not rely on 
systematic mistakes by consumers or cognitive biases of the type discussed in 
this article. The only study in which he directly examined a variety of pricing 
options (and not just the worst one) led him to conclude there are too many 
options—not for consumers, but for the providers themselves.73 His 
recommendation to cellphone providers to reduce the number of options 
offered due to their handling costs and lack of profitability is interesting, 
especially since in practice, the cellphone market (among others) is heading in 
the opposite direction.74 Here too, the basic assumption of rational consumers 
lacking biases or cognitive load underlies the model, and the assumption was 
not made explicit nor its veracity discussed. With no room for variety as the 
source of confusion or difficulty in comparing among providers, no explanation 
was found for the existence of so many options. 
 
 72. Here, it is interesting to remember the implicit assumption upon which Seim & Viard, supra 
note 65, based their work. In their study, variety was measured as a direct proxy for consumer welfare, 
with no attention to plan details. Thus, foggy prices were measured as part of the consumers’ benefit as 
well. The downside of making implicit assumptions about consumers valuing choice per se becomes 
apparent, even without the considerations of complexity and cognitive cost explained in this article. 
 73. See Eugenio J. Miravete, Are All Those Calling Plans Really Necessary? The Limited Gains 
from Complex Tariffs (Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 4237, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=509009. 
 74. Also interesting is the dismay perhaps experienced by an economist offering a rational 
explanation for consumer choice (rejecting cognitive constraints), while witnessing the lack of such 
rationality as to providers’ commercial dealings. 
AYAL 3/9/2011   
Spring 2011] HARMFUL FREEDOM OF CHOICE 125 
It should be noted that in most of the studies cited above, a simple 
comparison was made of two states of the world: before competition entered, 
and after it did. The mere fact of deregulation, together with the change in 
number of operators in the market, increases the salience of different 
alternatives. This leads consumers to be more aware of differences and be more 
able to attend to them. In most mature cellphone markets today, market 
segmentation is relatively stable, thus salience should be lower due to the lack 
of a distinct change to draw consumer attention. Also, if a large part of variety’s 
effect is in discriminating between naïve and sophisticated consumers, an 
empirical examination of cumulative effect suffers from a double bias. A 
sophisticate’s situation would likely improve with an increase in the number of 
alternatives, while a naïf’s would likely worsen. Bundling all consumers 
together will only allow for finding an average effect; even if the effect is large 
on each group separately, it will diminish due to opposite signs. This does not 
mean the data examined above shows such an effect, as this should be measured 
directly; but the conclusion such an effect is lacking requires substantiation that 
has not yet been provided. 
Recently, Oren Bar-Gill and Rebecca Stone found direct empirical 
verification of the effects of contract complexity on consumer choice.75 
Examining a dataset consisting of actual plan choice, usage, and payment, they 
compared possible explanations of what seemed to be mistakes in consumer 
choice. Focusing on the issue of choice and complexity in calling plans, they 
compared “rational” explanations with those allowing for consumers’ 
confusion, and showed that the data are much better explained by the latter. 
While consumer learning occurs over time, this process is insufficient to 
overcome the substantial welfare losses found.76 Of special interest is the fact 
that competition in the cellphone market does not dissipate provider profits 
resulting from contractual complexity, contrary to the assumptions implicit in 
the literature surveyed above. Finding a solution to this problem is the topic of 
the next section, which considers the appropriate normative response to issues 
of complexity and consumer mistakes. 
 
 75. Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 118 
(2009). 
 76. Consumer learning may be fostered by allowing consumers a quick response through changing 
calling plans. The lock-in effect of minimum-term contracts, as well as the psychic costs of studying and 
understanding the available alternatives, raise switching costs and thus reduce the incentive for learning 
ex ante. Note, of course, that the increase in plan complexity and available alternatives raises these 
learning (and thus switching) costs. See Martin Gaynor & John Heinz, Cell Phone Demand and 
Consumer Learning—An Empirical Analysis 25 (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 05-28, 2005) (noting 
evidence of learning over time, but in a setting where switching was easy and early termination was 
costless). 
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VI 
GIVEN HARMFUL COMPLEXITY, SHOULD THERE BE A REGULATORY 
RESPONSE? 
The picture painted so far is one of an overly rich menu of cellphone prices, 
causing consumer confusion and suboptimal choice, as well as lower 
competitive pressure on providers whose offerings are difficult to compare. 
From a regulatory point of view, there is a consumer-protection problem—
strategic complexity may cause consumers to choose incorrectly or, more 
generally, mislead them. There is also an antitrust problem—focusing not on 
the single consumer, but on the need for comparisons between providers to 
foster competition in the market.77 Cellphone markets are regulated in most 
jurisdictions, with specific regulators focusing on communications networks, 
while competition authorities and courts hear cases bearing on these issues, 
both within and outside of communications markets. 
Regulatory and court intervention in contractual complexity is possible in 
two main ways: limiting the number of calling plans providers may offer, or 
creating a simple basis for comparison upon which all calling plans must be 
based. The second option intervenes less than the first in market processes and 
providers’ freedom of action, and similar solutions were proposed in other 
markets suffering from similar issues.78 Even without state intervention, it is 
possible that market mechanisms could prevent at least some of the detrimental 
effects of cognitively constrained consumers. Such market mechanisms are 
based on providers’ interest in maintaining a positive image and include having 
their offerings rated by independent consumer organizations or the popular 
press, the leadership effect of sophisticated consumers, and the like.79 Still, the 
hope that market forces make direct intervention unnecessary seems overly 
optimistic, especially when dealing with an attribute consumers value—namely, 
the ability to choose. 
Mechanisms that interfere with consumers’ choice and that are justified by 
the need to protect them from mistakes are paternalistic in nature. Much has 
been said and written about the newly garnered support for paternalism based 
on behavioral economics and the relevant scientific literature. Since this support 
originates mostly from economists educated to respect private choice and 
market forces, the argument surrounding the new paternalism is fierce, with 
 
 77. The availability of antitrust intervention depends on whether explicit collusion exists, as well as 
the public attitude towards the legality of oligopolistic coordination and the existence of facilitating 
practices. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 78. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1377–79 (2004) 
(examining intervention in the credit card industry); Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, In Praise of Honest 
Pricing, 45 MIT–SLOAN MGMT. REV. 24, 26–28 (2003) (examining energy market intervention); Jon 
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1467–1552 (1999) (examining intervention in the tobacco market). 
 79. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law, 4 EUR. 
REV. CONT. L. 1 (2009); Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 
ERASMUS L. REV. 93 (2010). 
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many bringing up the known limitations of such intervention.80 In order to 
overcome the individual-choice problem and avoid forcing regulation on those 
for whom protection is unnecessary, techniques of asymmetric paternalism were 
developed, leaving a “safety valve” allowing some consumers to avoid 
regulation not in their best interest.81 Asymmetric paternalism, a.k.a. “soft” or 
“libertarian” paternalism, refers to regulation intended to protect naïve 
consumers likely to make mistakes due to their own cognitive limitations, while 
simultaneously not impeding the more sophisticated consumers from making 
their own choices. Examples include offering workers default 401(k) plans 
thought to be in their best interest (while allowing change), mandating simple 
comparison tables for credit offerings (while allowing competition regarding 
actual terms), and even moving healthy foods to the front of the cafeteria line 
(while allowing unhealthy foods to be offered, later down the line). The basic 
idea is simple: make sure naïve consumers are not tricked into choosing an 
option likely to be sub-optimal in the long run, while allowing sophisticates to 
maneuver through the array of choices and find their preferred one. The 
“asymmetric” component is important: it allows for some of the benefits of 
paternalism (as consumers are protected from their own choices, and from 
providers’ subtle trickery), without constraining the options of those who prefer 
to trust themselves and optimize accordingly. 
Some of the regulation popular in cellphone markets, such as limiting the 
length of commitment periods a provider may demand, follow this principle. 
Such limitations are based on an assumption that consumers cannot rationally 
take into account future price increases or consumption changes, stemming 
from the same type of cognitive limitations discussed in this article. These 
limitations also apply to providers offering distinct cellphone numbers, another 
attribute raising switching costs that a rational consumer should take into 
account ex ante. Regulators in many jurisdictions have acted to enforce number 
portability, showing an unwillingness to rely on perfect consumer rationality 
and foresight. Regulation of contractual complexity in the cellphone market 
relies on similar ideological grounds. 
 
 80. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006); Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U CHI. L. REV. 133 
(2006); Glen Whitman, Against the New Paternalism: Internalities and the Economics of Self-Control, 
563 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (2006); Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1245 (2005); Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: 
Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006). 
 81. See generally Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. 
REV. 175 (2003); Colin Camerer et al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1211 (2003). The status quo bias mentioned 
above is an excellent example. If diverging from the status quo is allowed, and most consumers decline 
to do so, it seems obvious that a regulatory agency would strive to make the default option the best for 
most consumers, or for most of those predicted not to invest the time and effort needed to make a 
conscious choice. Such regulation still allows consumers to choose differently, thus the constraint on 
individual liberty is minimal. On the other hand, there are reasons to doubt the efficacy of such “have 
the cake and eat it too” tactics. See supra note 80. 
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Competition, while generally helpful, is not expected to solve the problems 
alluded to here. Its beneficial effects would be mitigated by the existence of 
naïve consumers valuing variety and ignoring cognitive costs and their effects.82 
If consumers were rational utility-maximizers lacking any cognitive limitations 
or cost of thinking, obfuscation strategies would not work because competition 
would dissipate them. Of course, oligopolistic coordination can manifest itself 
directly in prices rather than complex behavioral tactics. In the present 
situation, however, the lower salience of behavioral tactics and complexity of 
contracts makes these more attractive from the providers’ point of view. From 
the consumers’ point of view, some would protest the unfairness of going 
through a process of excitement from abundance, choosing from a large set, 
trying to find the optimal contract, and eventually getting a long and 
complicated bill making understanding and comparison difficult. 
When considering regulatory intervention in contractual complexity, it is 
important to remember that the large variety is highly valued by consumers. 
Even relatively benign suggestions, such as requiring providers to list common 
attributes and create a common ground for comparison, still limit the freedom 
of providers unable to devise contracts at will (otherwise each contract will have 
its own attributes, difficult to compare with others). Furthermore, even 
requiring standard-form information disclosure of the type focused on by Bar-
Gill, recreates known regulatory problems such as needing to constantly adapt 
to a changing market, especially in a dynamic and innovative market such as the 
cellphone one. Here, as elsewhere, there are no easy answers or magic 
solutions. Intervention helping on one dimension is likely to harm in others, or 
its cost (including the rigidity imposed on the business world) might turn out to 
be high. This article focuses on pointing out the problem and understanding its 
sources; devising solutions and dealing with their unavoidable drawbacks 
requires separate consideration. 
One aspect raised above, the distinction between naïve and sophisticated 
consumers, requires additional thought.83 It is true that sophisticates, able to 
compare calling plans and form forward-looking incentives, could achieve lower 
prices. Regulatory intervention aimed at protecting more-naïve consumers also 
reduces the profit potential sophisticates see in learning the various offerings 
and alternatives. Sophistication is not a static attribute, but a dynamic character 
trait that changes with time, investment of effort, and sometimes money. The 
sophisticates work hard to find the best deal, and the fact that naïfs pay more is 
a result of their own laziness, not investing in understanding their commercial 
 
 82. This is because the driving force behind these practices is consumer preference and lack of 
foresight, rather than mere provider coordination. Thus, a provider offering fewer plans might benefit 
consumers, but this would only be perceived as such by sophisticates. Naïfs would focus on the smaller 
variety, impeding their perceived choice. See supra Part IV.B. 
 83. Id. 
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surroundings.84 Each description brings up different connotations, and it is 
important to remember the difference between describing a fact (the price 
difference between groups), and adding interpretations and personal opinions 
(who is to blame). The important point is that reducing the price difference also 
reduces the incentive to exert effort to find a better deal; thus, regulatory 
intervention encourages consumer laziness. It amounts to a proclamation that 
consumers are unable to make their own choices, or to understand the 
alternatives offered; instead the regulators must do the work for them. 
Demanding that providers arrange their offerings in a way that even naïfs can 
understand removes any need they might have to try and become more 
sophisticated. 
Since all human beings are tainted with cognitive limitations of some kind, 
this is not just a regulatory question but a matter of accepting the fact that the 
ability to choose is limited, even if a rich menu is placed before consumers. The 
existing tendency to offer great variety and pull consumers in with “sales” and 
“discounts” is a direct result of the value consumers place on the choice process 
itself, together with the excitement garnered from a new purchase. A consumer 
aware of his limitations will take them into account, whether in learning how to 
minimize payment for cellphone services, or forgoing the effort altogether, 
consciously deciding to pay a little more rather than wasting time on 
comparisons. If the purpose is maximizing utility—that is, subjective welfare—it 
is far from clear which option is best.85 The state’s attempt to save the consumer 
the cost of becoming more sophisticated might detract not just from a worthy 
incentive, but also harm the ability to satisfy one preference (wanting the 
process of choice) in order to foster another (choosing the best alternative). The 
tendency to see cognitive limitations as justifications for protective regulation 
must account for the ancillary harm to the joy of choice-making, as well as the 
problematic incentive to avoid investment in sophistication. The solution is far 
from obvious. 
It is precisely this point that motivated the choice of this specific market, 
cellphone calling-plans, to be assessed in this paper. If 
asymmetric/libertarian/soft paternalism is an appropriate policy choice to deal 
with other cognitive biases, cognitive load and hyperchoice situations should be 
part of the program. This market is a central and important one, at least with 
respect to the number of people affected. Still, this example more than others 
 
 84. “Laziness” invokes a negative connotation, implying a consumer’s obligation to take more care 
with commercial choices. It is also possible that cognitive biases are overemphasized, and consumer 
culture as a whole should be critically assessed. See Martha A. Starr, Saving, Spending, and Self-
Control: Cognition Versus Consumer Culture, 39 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 214, 227 (2007) (arguing 
that it is not better consumerism that should be fostered through law, but less consumerism). 
 85. See supra note 33. In light of the utility attained by “maximizers” versus “satisficers,” discussion 
of appropriate state intervention might best focus on education, such as encouraging enjoyment of the 
present and settling for “good enough,” rather than tweaking market mechanisms facilitating “optimal” 
consumer choice. This, though, is an issue requiring elaboration much beyond the scope of the current 
article, and will be developed further in future writings. 
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shows how intervention aimed at improving social and personal welfare also 
involves restricting choice in a manner that many may find objectionable. 
Understanding the mechanisms by which consumers choose, and providers’ 
adaptation to them, is important even if the appropriate regulatory response is 
uncertain. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
The cellphone market allows for a fascinating test case of several cognitive 
biases plaguing consumers, as well as marketing tactics of businesses adapting 
to such consumers. Some biases have already received regulatory responses 
aimed at protecting consumers, usually within a context of public debate 
stressing the freedom of choice. This article adds to the menu of relevant biases 
the problem of cognitive overload and over-abundance of contractual choice in 
the cellphone market. Given a difficulty understanding and processing 
information, the consumer finds himself offered a too-large variety, which 
harms his ability to choose optimally so that freedom of choice becomes mostly 
illusory. 
Since the basic intuition is that variety of alternatives is an advantage to the 
consumer interested in choice, those arguing that contractual variety can be a 
curse as well as a blessing bear a heavy burden. However, a review of the 
literature and experimental evidence, as well as real-world empirical studies, 
substantiates the basic argument that freedom of choice in the cellphone 
context is ill-served by increasing variety. Still, the basic tendency shared by 
most consumers is to prefer a rich menu of choices, even when the eventual 
enjoyment of the final choice suffers as a result. Thus, the preference for choice 
is no less real than the preference between alternatives, and there are a variety 
of contexts where these interests collide. Where this happens, the consumer will 
seek choice and suffer from suboptimal results. 
Implementing these psychological insights in the cellphone market allows 
for a renewed perspective on the prevalent marketing tactics, where harm to 
consumers appears in two ways: inability to make optimal choice and a 
lessening of competitive pressure on providers. The first raises issues from 
consumer-protection law and paternalistic regulation, while the second raises 
issues related to antitrust law and competition policy. The high concentration in 
most cellphone markets allows for oligopolistic coordination, where marketing 
tactics based on cognitive limitations allow providers to charge high prices in a 
less salient way than most models assume. 
The empirical literature on consumer choice illuminated the biases affecting 
researchers, who are quick to make implicit assumptions regarding consumer 
rationality and thus assume an increase in consumer welfare without examining 
alternative explanations. The distinction between sophisticated and naïve 
consumers demonstrates the price discrimination mechanism and the 
importance of complexity, and challenges the appropriateness of regulatory 
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intervention. Since consumers are interested in having a large variety even 
though it harms their eventual choice, it is unclear that it is appropriate for the 
state to prevent them from acting out this preference or reduce consumers’ 
incentive to figure out the way the market operates and increase their own 
sophistication. 
In the end, it is hard to say if regulation aimed at solving the information-
overload problem will do more good than harm. Still, posing the question seems 
important in order to delve further into the issues, as well as giving a richer 
context within which to discuss regulatory arrangements in other industries. It is 
this issue of contractual complexity that implicates freedom of choice most 
clearly, and easy answers are hard to come by. Since choice is not necessarily 
better (or more “free”) given many alternatives, it is difficult to determine how 
to best increase consumer autonomy. Education about the array of cognitive 
biases afflicting consumers may help in overcoming them, but it serves a deeper 
purpose. It increases consumer sophistication; but even more importantly, it 
allows for a deeper understanding of choice mechanisms. Even without a clear 
regulatory response, knowing ourselves and critically examining our own 
actions allow for attaining true freedom of choice: accepting reality and 
enjoying our own part in it, while understanding our limitations and being 
willing to pay their price. 
 
